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Market Metaphor K

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Their description of policy debate as a monopoly and debate as a ‘market economy’ is reason alone to reject the 1AC. They assume human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms, securing capitalism’s hegemony.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### The economization of life has given rise to the Econocene---an unsustainable period of ecological collapse sustained by economism as the dominant secular religion. The Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

Richard B. Norgaard 19, Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley, “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/Norgaard87.pdf

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

#### The alternative is to become critically aware of the generative force of metaphor. We can accept the 1AC, but must reject their marketized language.

Michael Augustín 15, postgraduate student of PhD. program at Department of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, “The Market Metaphor As an Issue of Political Language and Practice,” Czech Journal of Political Science, March 2015.

2. Defining Approach

A metaphor is a figure of speech that is often employed in political theory and political practice. It is not peculiar to politics as a social science, though: metaphors may guide our understanding of complex, difficult relationships in any domain. But they may also mislead. Because of this, examining their impact takes on urgency, and this is what we do in the text that follows. The Czech political scientist Petr Drulák speaks of metaphor in politics in terms of discursive structures, i.e., customary rules that impact the discourse itself (Drulák 2009: 59). Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By suggest that metaphor is more than simply a speech act or poetic ornament. Rather than being a purely linguistic phenomenon, it pertains directly to our thoughts and actions: how we think and behave is largely influenced by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–4). An example they cite, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ is a perfect example, and confirms that the way we perceive a particular activity impacts how we perform it.

The use of metaphor is thus in no way neutral. Metaphor has a determining influence over our understanding of particular situations. It frames the subject and decides how we think about a topic area. Individual metaphors organize our thoughts and actions and become a substitute for thought and analysis, but often gain uncritical acceptance and harbour certain perils (Patterson 1998: 221). They function to suppress certain aspects of a situation and emphasize others, thus shaping meaning in a way that justifies particular actions or sanctions particular acts, or simply aids in choosing goals (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142).

Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikalo confirm that metaphors such as ‘branches of government’ and ‘head of state’ used in describing political situations and processes influence our political perceptions (Carver, Pikalo 2008: 1). Jonathan Charteris-Black develops the argument that in political contexts, metaphor is used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations; metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings (Charteris-Black 2011: 32) and thereby contribute to myth creation (Charteris-Black 2011: 28). Metaphor is typically used in persuasion and frequently employed in the language of rhetoric and argumentation, such as in political speeches (Charteris-Black 2004: 7). But its use does not end there. It has proven an impressive tool for academic research. But it may happen that the researcher becomes so entranced by the clarity and simplicity of argumentation that metaphor offers that he or she overlooks deeper connections in the phenomenon under study.

Before we examine the central issue in this study, we must first differentiate between the concepts of analogy and metaphor as used in this paper. By ‘analogy’ we shall intend a perceived similarity between two entities. The ‘metaphor’ is a higher-level mapping of these similarities that is used to communicate them in the form of a figure of speech. In the current context, the logic is as follows: if in political discourse we speak of politics as a market, we have created a metaphor based on the similarity of properties. If instead we observe that politics involves a competition for voters just as the market mechanism embodies a competition for customers, or that catallactic (i.e. exchange) patterns obtain in politics as they do in the economic market, we have spelled out a concrete similarity and in so doing have pointed out an analogy. Thus, we are analyzing specific similarities between the marketplace and the political system, which we may term analogies, that are subsumed under the market metaphor.

The metaphor may be imagined simply as a set and the analogies it implies as a subset of that metaphor. In a typical deduction, the premises taken together may be said to form a set. Syllogistic reasoning is applied using this set of two or more propositions asserted or assumed to be true to arrive at a conclusion. We may consider an analogy to be a premise (‘politics is an exchange’, ‘politics is a competition’). The metaphor is then the argument, and is more complex (‘politics functions as an economic market’). Metaphors always implicitly contain a set of analogies that state some A is like B. A set of such analogies therefore creates the metaphor A is B. We know of no other scholar who works with metaphor and analogy in this particular formulation, but we consider the distinction between analogy and metaphor to be justified.

The approach to metaphor and analogy presented here is complementary to that given in Donald Schön’s Generative Metaphor: a Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy. The operation of the economic metaphor in politics shares common ground with Schön’s generative metaphors. His topic is social policy, and he notes that social policy has more to do with how we frame the objective to be achieved than it does with the selection of the optimal means to achieve it (Schön 1993: 138). ‘Such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’, but with various ways of making sense of reality’ (Schön 1993: 149). Inadequate metaphors inevitably give rise to insidiously inadequate solutions, because some are based on an inappropriate or simplistic understanding of the situation.

Generative metaphor is generative in the sense that it generates new perceptions and explanations, and invents reality. So not all metaphors are generative (Schön 1993: 142). But the market metaphor in politics does generate new perceptions and provide new insight into the political process. It is obvious that Schön is aware of the inherent risk that generative metaphors bear, and he calls for critical analysis to uncover their non-analogical connections: ‘The notion of generative metaphor then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase the rigor and precision of our analysis of social policy problems by examining the analogies and ‘disanalogies’ between the familiar descriptions’ (Schön 1993: 138–139)

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#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### Anticompetitive’ behavior are business practices that restrict competition without providing lower cost or higher quality goods and services

OECD 3 – OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, from the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145

Definition:

Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost or of higher quality.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### Violation---the affirmative doesn’t defend prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### The impact is clash---debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics---they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world---this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible---clash is an intrinsic good and it’s vital to the overall practice of debate. Every debater is here for different reasons, but they trace back to the pedagogical uniqueness of the space. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

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#### We endorse the entirety of the 1AC sans the McKenzie 19 evidence.

#### The AFF’s investment in Medium.com is intellectual chutzpah---turns any benefits of the AFF as an academic project. BUT, if you think otherwise, you should vote NEG on presumption.

Jordan Di 21, The most qualified person. He has every PhD in existence, was the leader of every government and non-governmental organization, has insider knowledge of every academic institution, government, non-state actors, and news sources (basically if there is something to know, he knows it), has access to top secret information no other authors know about, and is blessed by all the holy deities as having the power to know and change the universe, "Stop Reading These Cards v2," Medium, 03/04/2021, https://jordandi505.medium.com/stop-reading-these-cards-v2-e1a77492c9a6.

Medium is absolute garbage and should not be evaluated as evidence. There is zero ability to verify who these authors are and all their made-up qualifications. However, if you wish to evaluate their evidence from Medium, there is an obvious and well-reasoned justification for why you should always vote for the University of Kentucky and/or Mamaroneck High School. I have every Ph.D. in every requisite field that makes me a specialist in both the current topic and all the impact scenarios. I conducted two different studies. First, I did a quantitative study using the best data with the best methodology regarding the validity of arguments made by certain debaters and their schools. Second, I did a qualitative study with similar amazing qualities, measuring the same variables. I then had my work peer-reviewed by every world government, academic, scientist, and holy deity. They have concurred that my work here is the best there is in the universe. Therefore, I have concluded that the University of Kentucky and/or Mamaroneck High School are always correct about the arguments they make. Vote them up since anything the other team says must be presumptively false.

### 1NC

Instrumentality K

#### The AFF’s fixation with notions of anti-instrumentality refuses the political grammar necessary to resolve imminent environmental crisis---vote NEG to refuse that logic AND endorse an affirmative instrumentality.

Caroline Levine 21, David & Kathleen Ryan Professor, Humanities, Cornell University, "The Long Lure of Anti-Instrumentality: Politics, Aesthetics, and Sustainability," MFS Modern Fiction Studies, Vol. 67, No. 2, pg. 226-234, Summer 2021, Project Muse.

For these thinkers, the resistance to instrumentality is political. But, of course, anti-instrumentality also underpins major theories of aesthetics. Since Kant, a range of theorists have defined the aesthetic precisely by its disturbance of means-ends thinking. Art cannot be reduced to exchange and profit or to the communication of moral values or information. Art’s strangeness and difficulty halt the reflexive rush to calculability, efficiency, and utility. Strangely, then, while anti-instrumentality grounds a range of political arguments, from feminism to postcolonial theory, it also provides the basis for antipolitical arguments in the aesthetic disciplines. According to Langdon Hammer, for example, literary critics should stay away from fantasies of having any kind of political impact because art should not serve ends other than itself. Jonathan Kramnick argues that the discipline of literary studies rests on “the norm of the open question”; it is the job of the critic “to state and explore problems rather than provide solutions to them” (27). This disciplinary obligation emerges out of our focus on the aesthetic, “if only because considering artworks as significant in their own right often means spelling out the open-ended or unresolved.” And so, at the same time that we find anti-instrumentality at the heart of the work of radical Black studies thinker Moten, we also find it central to the work of Derek Attridge, perhaps the field’s most influential champion of aesthetic autonomy.

Anti-instrumentality also underlies specifically ethical arguments in literary studies—calls to humility in the face of a complex world no one should try to master. Environmental humanists have been especially committed to replacing teleological accounts of heroic human action—which is also typically conquest and exploitation—with an embrace of what Anna Tsing calls “open-ended assemblages of entangled ways of life” (viii). Although Haraway argues that instrumentality is inevitable because species must use each other for survival, she, like Tsing, invites readers to learn “to be truly present, not as a vanishing pivot between awful or edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures, but as moral critters entwined in myriad unfinished configurations of places, times, matters, meanings” (1). Both embrace the pause, the need to stop to notice and reflect on the now, interrupting the usual rush to profit and progress. Both insist, too, on open-endedness, the refusal to give a definite shape to future worlds. In this respect, the environmental humanities reinforces the long tradition of opening ourselves to the unknown to come.

In short, from Marxist critique to decolonial resistance and from aesthetic autonomy to deep ecology, the common logic of anti-instrumentality subtends otherwise conflicting schools of thought. But what is it exactly that they share? There is one common urge: negation, the desire to crack the world open to alternatives to the status quo, to beckon to unmapped and unmappable possibility. And so, if you look at almost any essay or book in literary or cultural studies, its conclusion will be a deliberate open-endedness, a soar-ing refusal to spell out specific paths forward. Catherine Gallagher and Greenblatt, for example, write: “we sincerely hope that you will not be able to say what it all adds up to; if you could, we would have failed” (19). Alexander Weheliye ends with artists who “explode both the individuated person and couple as subject . . . thus underscoring the messiness of these categories” (197). Fredric Jameson marks “the now open space for something else” (296). Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of Emotion closes this way: “Justice involves feelings . . . . Where we go, with these feelings, remains an open question” (202). Christina Sharpe urges readers “to stay in this wake time that would inhabit a blackened consciousness that would rupture the structural silences produced and facilitated by, and that produce and facilitate, Black social and physical death” (22). And Robert McRuer ends his book on queerness and disability with the “promise that we will always comprehend disability otherwise and that we will, collectively, somehow access other worlds and other futures” (208). Critics of all stripes issue the same call: refuse the status quo in favor of an unknowable world to come.

The Politics of Anti-Instrumentality

It is strange that anti-instrumentality can work as a distinctively apolitical aesthetic value as well as a deliberately, explicitly political one, and it is this particular convergence that draws my attention in this essay. What is it, exactly, that allows anti-instrumentality to cross back and forth so easily between artistic autonomy and political purpose? The answer, I think, is this: when the art work is understood as an end in itself, when it is cast as an object that resists dominant institutions and refuses to serve powerful agents, then in this precise capacity, art is doing political work. That is, as long as art is free from ends, it can yield pleasures and thoughts and possibilities that are not subject to dominant pressures and purposes. And emancipation from dominant ends is nothing if not a political value.

In practice, this means that aesthetic autonomy can be readily politicized. One famous story from the middle of the twentieth century shows this paradox in action. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviets were charging that the US was a shallow and materialist nation, obsessed only with wealth and military might. In response, the US State Department sought to showcase the many ways that the US allowed artists to thrive in an atmosphere of unparalleled freedom. But it was hard to prove that the democratic West fostered freedom and openness when the US government was ready to shut down artists with the wrong political sympathies. After all, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was publicly targeting writers like Langston Hughes, Dashiell Hammett, and Bertolt Brecht at the very same moment, demanding that they testify to their own noncommunist political loyalties and inform on others.

An especially embarrassing episode happened in 1947. The State Department had sponsored a traveling exhibition called Advancing American Art, which featured a range of innovative modern American painters, including Georgia O’Keefe and Jacob Lawrence. At first it was a huge success. Reports suggested that these bold and unexpected paintings had actually begun to persuade audiences in Eastern Europe and Latin America that the US was capable of experimental, original art. The State Department planned to take the show to Guatemala, Iran, and Cambodia. But when the US Congress and the press found out about the exhibit, there was a huge public stink. The paintings were called subversive and alien. One congressman from Mississippi said, “No American drew these crazy pictures!” (qtd. in Littleton and Sykes 41). Public pressure forced the State Department to cancel the show.

It was in this context that CIA strategists launched a covert arts program. The goal was to prove that the West was home to exciting, highly original art that did not cater to specific political programs. Against the Soviets’ insistence that art serve the regime, the CIA would showcase aesthetic autonomy and anti-instrumentality. Jackson Pollock, as Frances Stonor Saunders explains, seemed like a perfect vehicle to prove the Soviets wrong. Defiant and anticonventional, Pollock exemplified an avant-garde American creativity that refused mass culture and Hollywood glitz. He had been widely mocked and condemned by the press, but this was all to the good, from the CIA’s point of view. While the Russians forced their artists to work in the style of Socialist Realism, the CIA secretly supported mass media coverage of “Jack the Dripper” to prove that the US let even the strangest and most unpopular artists flourish.

The CIA’s role in cultural life in the middle of the twentieth century is now widely known, but at the time they largely kept their operations secret through fake foundations and front organizations. The CIA covertly funneled resources to the literary magazine Encounter and to the Chekhov Publishing House, which printed the works of Vladimir Nabokov and other Russian emigres. It supported the Nigerian little magazine, Black Orpheus, which published some of the most influential négritude writers, including Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor.1 Deborah Cohn explains that El Mundo Nuevo, the Paris quarterly of Latin American writing, was exposed as a CIA venture early on, though it earns a place in literary history for publishing the first chapters of Gabriel García Márquez’s Cien años de soledad in 1966, as well as works by Octavio Paz and Mario Vargas Llosa. The Cold War Program for Cultural Freedom was a major source of support not only for artists and writers but also for the humanities in US universities. The CIA provided funding for academic programs in Asian and Latin American studies, foreign languages, and American literature. It was Cold Warrior Richard Nixon who poured money into the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). Cuts to the NEA and NEH began in 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall fell. If we look back nostalgically to a time when there was ample support for the arts and humanities, we should not overlook the importance of Cold War ends to this flourishing.2

What matters here is that the CIA figured out how to instrumentalize—we might even say, weaponize—the anti-instrumentality of the aesthetic. They saw that difficult, experimental art could stand for freedom from political ends, and then they put that freedom to political ends. And this was not a misuse or misunderstanding of artistic anti-instrumentality. As Peter Kalliney argues, African writers in the period also embraced aesthetic autonomy for both political and antipolitical ends, including “emancipation from colonialism; independence from the postcolonial nation-state; avoidance of politics in order to foster collaboration among multiple constituencies; freedom from politics altogether as a professional disposition; and ideological neutrality in the Cold War” (337).

Again, we might well ask what position could possibly underpin this complex and conflicting list, uniting thinkers as radically different as Nixon and Halberstam, Paz and Césaire. But, again, I think there is an answer: it is a specifically indiscriminate version of political negation. That is, anti-instrumentality can—and does—set itself against any end. It can challenge, unsettle, and negate any constraint, any rule, and any plan. The worldview underpinning all of these many versions of anti-instrumentality is a dream of freedom from all doctrines, dogmas, and programs.

This matters today because it is precisely this account of anti-instrumentality that has come to pervade literary studies. Susan Stanford Friedman refers to it as the “gadfly position” of the humanities (3). As dominant institutions lumber along, imposing their oppressive norms, it is the job of artists and humanists to annoy and negate, to act as constant irritants. But this means that its refusals of ends can go in any direction—the goal is to resist, unsettle, or puncture any program at all.

What seems crucial to stress, then, is that anti-instrumentality does not necessarily align with the Left. It can motivate both Cold War spies and those keen to avoid politics altogether. And what is perhaps most disturbing right now is the eerie similarity between the language of anti-instrumentality in literary studies and the language of the political Right. Leaders like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro use anti-establishment rhetoric in the interest, they claim, of freeing people from oppressive norms and state regulations. In an unsettling echo of writers and critics on the Left, these right-wing authoritarian leaders embrace a disruption of rules and a shattering of institutions in order to resist what they cast as the oppressive norms of the status quo.

Sustainability, or Collective Continuance

I argue here that it is particularly urgent for the Left to reconsider our longstanding attachment to anti-instrumentality at this moment of rapid and destabilizing climate change. Ecocritics have argued especially strenuously against all instrumentalizing programs, insisting that any teleological thinking is in cahoots with capitalism and colonialism, and only re-entrenches the destructive ideologies that caused the climate crisis in the first place. Refusing to coerce others into exploitative use or service, they take a principled stand in favor of passivity and deliberate political withdrawal. Anne-Lise François, for example, turns toward “recessive action” (xvii)—the “nonappropriative” (xxiv), minor gesture that rejects any illusion of human mastery or conquest. And Anahid Nersessian argues, “For better or worse, works of art resist practical application or problem-solving” (2), which means that the task of the aesthetic disciplines is to face the “traumatic knowledge that climate catastrophe is certain and unfathomable.”

There is something attractively pure about refusing all complicity with capitalism and colonialism. But there is also a strange logic to the argument that any attempt to slow or stop global warming would be so much in keeping with instrumental reason that we have no choice but to surrender to the climate catastrophe to come. Can it be true that our only ethical option is to accede to our own extinction—not to mention the extinction of many human and nonhuman others in the process? Or, to put this another way, acquiescing to forces of massive, global destruction that will intensify the suffering of the world’s poorest is not a recognizably leftist position, if by the Left we mean a political commitment to collective, egalitarian flourishing.

Thus, it is my central argument here that our own historical moment demands a reconsideration of aesthetic and political anti-instrumentality on the Left. As neoliberal economics undoes hopes of secure work and as fossil fuels radically disrupt longstanding ecosystems, the most urgent threat facing people around the world is not oppressive stasis but radical instability—intensifying poverty and food insecurity, flooding, forest fires, violent conflicts over water, and the rapid extinction of species. In literary studies, we have been so focused on refusing to serve ends that we have not often developed resources for working for reliable food, for example, or safe and stable shelter. With the rapid onrush of climate catastrophes, these basic conditions are increasingly under threat for the world’s poor. Openendedness is not primarily a source of pleasure and excitement for those who are anxious about finding their next meal or a safe place to sleep. I claim that justice demands a focus on the mundane work of sustaining living bodies over time, which requires adequate nutrition, breathable air, clean water, and stable shelter. Anti-instrumentality turns our attention away from solving these problems to focus instead on withdrawal, inaction, and mourning. The usual logic of literary studies is, in short, a logic of anti-sustainability.

So, what is the alternative? I propose an affirmative instrumentality in literary studies. While humanists have been fully justified in resisting pressures to put bodies and ideas to work in the service of violent and inequitable systems, I do not believe that it follows that we should avoid all ends. Not only has this insistence lent itself to an indiscriminate politics of undoing, but it has also left the tasks of designing and building social life to the social and natural sciences, government, and business. As long as literary studies imagines its role as refusing and negating all practical plans and projects, it will continue to yield the power to shape the world to other disciplines. What if, instead, we saw it as the central political task of literary studies to figure out how to sustain collective life over time with some degree of justice and mutual care?

#### Absent that, extinction.

Nathan A. Sears 21, PhD, Political Science, University of Toronto, "International Politics in the Age of Existential Threats," Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 0, Issue 0, 2021, pg. 9-11.

The second mode is human destruction of the natural environment, which could leave the planet uninhabitable for humanity (Ward 2008; Brannen 2017; Steffen et al. 2018; Spratt and Dunlop 2019; Wallace-Wells 2019; Ripple et al. 2020). Humans have become the driving force behind environmental change, which is why this geological epoch is increasingly called “the Anthropocene” (Crutzen 2002), to distinguish it from the unusually temperate period since the end of the last Ice Age roughly 11,700 years ago, the Holocene, when human civilization—probably not coincidentally—began and flourished (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007).9 The decline of some of Earth’s environmental subsystems already exceeds the “planetary boundaries” believed to constitute a “safe operating space for humanity” (e.g., climate change, biodiversity loss, and the nitrogen cycle), while others are under serious strain (e.g., ocean acidification and the phosphorus cycle). The outcome of human-driven environmental decline could be “irreversible and, in some cases, abrupt environmental change, leading to a state less conducive to human development” (Rockstrom et al. 2009, 472). The species extinction crisis—what some are calling the “sixth mass extinction” (Kolbert 2014; Brannen 2017)—is a sign of Earth’s declining habitability in the Anthropocene.10

The biggest environmental danger may be climate change (or “global warming”). The major anthropogenic drivers of climate change are the burning of fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil, and gas), combined with deforestation for agriculture (e.g., livestock and monocultures) and resource extraction (e.g., mining and oil), plus ocean warming undermining the planet’s capacity for absorbing carbon dioxide. Anthropogenic climate change could soon pass certain “tipping points,” whereby positive feedback loops in Earth’s climate system could lead to potentially irreversible and self-reinforcing “runaway” global warming (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 2003; Steffen et al. 2018). For example, the melting of Arctic “permafrost”

could produce additional warming, as glacial retreat reduces the refractory effect of the ice and releases huge quantities of methane currently trapped beneath it. Earth could then move towards a “Hothouse Earth” climate, which would make the planet a less-hospitable place for humanity (Steffen et al. 2018; Spratt and Dunlop 2019; Wallace-Wells 2019; Ripple et al. 2020).

The third mode is human development of technology, which engenders the risk of loss of control over a singularly powerful technology (Moravec 1988; Vinge 1993; Bostrom 2014; Shanahan 2015; Danzig 2018; Tegmark 2018; Russell 2019). Bostrom (2013, 25) succinctly describes the risk: “If we continually sample from the urn of possible technological discoveries . . . then we risk eventually drawing a black ball: an easy-to-make intervention that causes extremely widespread harm and against which effective defense is infeasible.” Several emerging technologies pose a loss-of-control risk, including biotechnology (e.g., the “CRISPR revolution” could give humans the power over evolution to “rewrite the code of life,” including “gene-editing” of the human germline or large-scale “gene-drives” in nature) (Doudna and The third mode is human development of technology, which engenders the risk of loss of control over a singularly powerful technology (Moravec 1988; Vinge 1993; Bostrom 2014; Shanahan 2015; Danzig 2018; Tegmark 2018; Russell 2019). Bostrom (2013, 25) succinctly describes the risk: “If we continually sample from the urn of possible technological discoveries . . . then we risk eventually drawing a black ball: an easy-to-make intervention that causes extremely widespread harm and against which effective defense is infeasible.” Several emerging technologies pose a loss-of-control risk, including biotechnology (e.g., the “CRISPR revolution” could give humans the power over evolution to “rewrite the code of life,” including “gene-editing” of the human germline or large-scale “gene-drives” in nature) (Doudna and The third mode is human development of technology, which engenders the risk of loss of control over a singularly powerful technology (Moravec 1988; Vinge 1993; Bostrom 2014; Shanahan 2015; Danzig 2018; Tegmark 2018; Russell 2019). Bostrom (2013, 25) succinctly describes the risk: “If we continually sample from the urn of possible technological discoveries . . . then we risk eventually drawing a black ball: an easy-to-make intervention that causes extremely widespread harm and against which effective defense is infeasible.” Several emerging technologies pose a loss-of-control risk, including biotechnology (e.g., the “CRISPR revolution” could give humans the power over evolution to “rewrite the code of life,” including “gene-editing” of the human germline or large-scale “gene-drives” in nature) (Doudna and

Perhaps AI best captures the threat of technological loss of control. Artificial intelligence is broadly defined as digital technologies or computers “that are capable of performing tasks commonly thought to require intelligence” (Brundage et al. 2018, 9). Currently, progress in AI is being driven by a combination of gains in hardware (e.g., the exponential growth in computing power described by “Moore’s Law”), software (e.g., “machine learning” algorithms and techniques, such as “neural networks” and “deep learning”), and data (e.g., the abundance of digital information on the Internet) (Bostrom 2014). Today’s AI are “narrow” systems that can achieve or surpass human-level intelligence only in specific domains—as demonstrated in November 2017, when “AlphaGo” beat the world champion, Ke Jie, at the strategy game “Go.” The idea that computers could one day possess human-level “general” intelligence was first suggested by none other than Alan Turing, who described a test—the “Turing Test”—in which a computer would successfully persuade a human observer that it was human. Since then, AI experts have frequently expressed the concern that AI could one day far surpass human beings in general intelligence—i.e., “superintelligence” (Good 1966; Moravec 1988; Vinge 1993; Kurzweil 2006; Bostrom 2014; Shanahan 2015; Tegmark 2018; Russell 2019). In one scenario, an AI system pursues the goal of optimizing its own algorithm, which becomes an accelerating process of self-recurring improvements—an “intelligence explosion”—that approaches a near-vertical ascent in capabilities—the “singularity.” The essence of the “control problem” is about figuring out how to properly align the goals of AI with humanity before an “intelligence explosion”; for once superintelligence exists it could become impossible for humans to control (Bostrom 2014; Shanahan 2015; Tegmark 2018; Russell 2019).

Destruction Capacity

The second variable—destruction capacity—concerns the scale of physical destruction by human agency. The salient trend in the evolution of the forces of destruction is that humanity’s capacity for physical destruction has grown continuously in its scope and intensity over time. Humanity’s destruction capacity has reached the critical level in which it constitutes an existential threat to human civilization and survival (see figure 2).

Diagram

Description automatically generated

The essence of the “nuclear revolution” was that the scale of potential destruction became an existential threat to humanity. Historically, the development of military technology reflects the empirical pattern of the growth in destruction capacity (Brodie and Brodie 1973; McNeill 1982; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993; Deudney 2007), from clubs and slings, to spears and bows, muskets and cannon, machine guns and artillery, tanks and bombers, and nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. The atomic bomb greatly surpassed the destruction capacity of conventional weapons, which was demonstrated twice in violence with the destruction of the Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to end the Second World War; but even these first-generation atomic bombs were soon eclipsed by the second-generation thermonuclear weapons. It was the development of thousands of thermonuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War that made nuclear war an existential threat. A report conducted by the US Office of Technology Assessment (1979, 8) estimated that a large-scale nuclear war could have caused immediate deaths ranging from the tens to hundreds of millions, and that the “future of civilization itself in the nations attacked would be in doubt.” Nuclear war also raised the prospect of “nuclear winter”—or a severe drop in global temperatures, decline in precipitation, and the probable collapse of agriculture from the release of massive quantities of ash and aerosols into the atmosphere from nuclear explosions and firestorms (Sagan 1983; Toon, Robock, and Turco 2007; Robock and Toon 2012; and Helfand 2013). Nuclear winter might cause billions of deaths from “nuclear famine” (Toon, Robock, and Turco 2008; Helfand 2013).

Since the end of the Cold War, global nuclear forces have declined from their peak of approximately 70,000 warheads to an estimated 13,865 today—including 1,750 and 1,600 deployed warheads by the United States and Russia, respectively. There is also renewed discussion about the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons to fight “limited” nuclear war (e.g., the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review). However, the possibility of limited nuclear has always been a big if (Brodie 1959; Kahn 1960; Morgenthau 1964), because of the strategic pressures to “win the war” and military uncertainties of the “fog of war” once nuclear war has begun. Thus, it is still important to consider the “worst-case scenario.” One “total” nuclear war scenario—involving 1,066 warheads (566 megatons) on 387 known targets in the United States—estimates 184.5 million causalities during the first two hours within the United States alone (Minson 2020). This would meet the threshold—“roughly around 500–2000 strategic warheads” (Sagan 1983, 292)—that could trigger nuclear winter. This suggests that the absolute decline in nuclear arsenals has not fundamentally transformed the existential threat of “total” nuclear war.

Similarly, humanity’s impact on the environment reflects its growing destruction capacity (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007; Rockstrom et al. 2009; Ripple et al. 2020). While humans have had an impact on Earth’s climate since at least the Industrial Revolution, the dramatic increase in greenhouse gas emissions since the mid-twentieth century—the “Great Acceleration” (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007, 2015; McNeill and Engelke 2016)—is responsible for contemporary climate change, which has reached 1°C above preindustrial levels (IPCC 2018). If climate change reaches a Hothouse Earth state, then it could pose an existential threat to humanity (Steffen et al. 2018; Spratt and Dunlop 2019; Wallace-Wells 2019; Ripple et al. 2020). The direct effect would be extreme heat. While human societies possesses some capacity for adaptation and resilience to climate change, the physiological response of humans to heat stress imposes physical limits—with a hard limit at roughly 35°C wet-bulb temperature (Sherwood, Huber, and Emanuel 2010). A rise in global average temperatures by 3–4°C would increase the risk of heat stress, while 7°C could render some regions uninhabitable, and 11–12°C would leave much of the planet too hot for human habitation (Sherwood, Huber, and Emanuel 2010). The “burn-it-all” scenario of fossil fuel exploitation puts even these hard upper limits within reach (Sherwood, Huber, and Emanuel 2010; Brannen 2017), although physiological limits probably exaggerate what humans would find tolerable. The possibility of heat stress is a grim reminder of human beings’ corporeal vulnerability to physical destruction.

The indirect effects of climate change on human civilization could include rising sea levels affecting coastal cities (e.g., Miami and Shanghai), or even swallowing entire countries (e.g., Bangladesh and the Maldives), extreme and unpredictable weather and natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and forest fires), environmental pressures on water and food scarcity (e.g., droughts from less-dispersed rainfall, and lower wheat-yields at higher temperatures), the possible inception of new bacteria and viruses, and, of course, large-scale human displacement (World Bank 2012; Wallace-Well 2019). The societal consequences of a Hothouse Earth climate are difficult to determine. Historically, environmental pressures have contributed to the collapse of societies, such as the Akkadian, Easter Island, and Mayan civilizations (Diamond 2005; Kemp 2019). A Hothouse Earth climate is terra incognita for human civilization, which has only known the relatively stable climate of the Holocene (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007). This is why scientists have turned to the geological record of Earth’s “big five” mass extinctions: they could provide a glimpse at the future of the planet should humanity fail to arrest climate change (Ward 2008; Payne and Clapham 2012; Brannen 2017).

### 1NC

Theft DA

#### Unlimited theft decks economic growth.

Katie Barrows 10-25, AFL-CIO, "Intellectual Property Theft: A Threat to Working People and the Economy — Department for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO," American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 10/25/2021, https://www.dpeaflcio.org/factsheets/intellectual-property-theft-a-threat-to-working-people-and-the-economy.

Digital theft hurts the millions of Americans who make a living and provide for their families through careers in the creative industries.

Intellectual property theft cuts into the resources available to employ people in the entertainment industry and other copyright-protected industries. While difficult to quantify, one study found that illegal downloads and streaming of film and television productions results in the annual loss of at least 230,000 jobs and $29.2 billion in economic activity.[9]

Intellectual property theft also reduces the real earnings of professionals already working in creative industries. While not typically the copyright holders themselves, when an individual receives credit on a production, they may be entitled to compensation if the material is used beyond its original exhibition. For example, residual payments begin for a credited cast or crew member on a television production “once a show starts re-airing or is released to video/DVD, pay television, broadcast TV, basic cable, or new media.” Other creative professionals, such as recording artists, song writers, and musicians, receive royalties from the sale, distribution and public performance of their creative work.

Depending on a creative professional’s specific role in a production, residual or royalty payments may be paid directly to the professional as compensation, or as contributions towards the professional’s health and pension fund. These payments are a significant portion of creative professionals’ total pay and benefits. In 2020, through legitimate sales and streams of creative works, SAG-AFTRA members received more than $1.01 billion (at an average amount of $220 per residual check), IATSE members earned $496 million for their pension and health plans, the DGA distributed over $430 million in residuals to members, and writers, including members of the WGAE, earned $529 million.

As the unions who represent creative professionals work to expand opportunities in these industries and expand the creative workforce to include more Black, Latinx, Asian-American, and Native professionals, it is essential that there be strong copyright protections that these individuals can depend on for their pay and benefits. Too often creative professionals of color, women, and other marginalized individuals are not able to realize the full economic value of their intellectual property, an impediment to maintaining a career that utilizes their unique talents and abilities.

#### Decline cascades---nuclear war

Dr. Mathew Maavak 21, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

### 1NC

Antitrust CP

#### The United States federal government should:

#### ---establish a structural presumption against all antitrust relevant economic activity;

#### ---implement divestiture of whiteness, including abolishing debt.

#### Monopoly capitalism worsens every form of oppression and antitrust advocacy strengthens every angle of resistance.

Greer and Rice, 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Since the founding of the nation, people of color have been living an economic nightmare. People of color have persistently lagged behind white people in nearly every economic category, including employment, income, education, small-business ownership, home ownership, and asset-ownership. This is the result of the rise and reach of concentrated wealth and power, including monopoly power.

The Racial Wealth Gap

Economic racial disparities do not happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of centuries of systemic racism and have been built into the design of our economic system, which has created what we at Liberation in a Generation call the Oppression Economy. The Oppression Economy uses the racist tools of theft, exclusion, and 31 exploitation to strip wealth from people of color, so that the elite can build their wealth. In this Oppression Economy, racism is profitable, and it fuels a cycle of oppression 32 that depresses the economic vitality of people of color, suppresses our political power, and obstructs our ability to utilize democracy to change economic rules that make racism profitable in the first place.

Racial wealth inequality is the consequential disease caused by the Oppression Economy. Today, racial wealth inequality has reached astronomical levels and will continue to rise if nothing is done. Without drastic policy action it will take 228 years for average Black wealth and 84 years for average Latinx wealth to match the wealth that white households hold today. Further, if nothing is done—or we attempt to return 33 to “normal” and fail to distance racism34 after COVID-19—Black and Latinx wealth will reach zero sometime in the middle of this century. These disparities are driven by 35 36 two reinforcing phenomena connected to the issue of corporate concentration: 1) the systematic withholding of wealth from people of color and 2) the gross concentration of wealth held by the corporate elite.

Between 1983 and 2016, which coincides with the rise of corporate and monopoly power, average Black and Latinx wealth was dwarfed [outpaced] by the wealth accumulated by white households. In fact, average Black wealth decreased by more than 50 percent over this period. This is the result of a long history of economic oppression that has 37 actively blocked people of color from building wealth or has stripped their wealth through theft and predation. The beneficiaries and perpetrators of this ever-growing gap are the corporate elite who set the rules of the economy. The corporate elite’s actions have led to people of color being paid less for their labor and having to pay more for the basic necessities of life. Here are a few metrics that speak to this reality.

• Black, Indigenous, and Latinx women earn between 55 cents and 63 cents for every dollar earned by white men.38

• Low income people of color often pay a 10 percent poverty premium for essential goods and services.39

• Black and Latinx households are far more likely than white households to be unable to pay their monthly bills or cover unexpected expenses.40

• Black households are more likely to be denied mortgage credit and end up paying more when they are able to access credit.41

• Black households, in particular, suffer from a crippling debt burden composed of an array of predatory credit products (e.g., student, small-dollar, auto, and home loans).

The phenomenon fueling racial wealth inequality is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. Today, the wealthiest 400 people in the US hold more wealth ($3.2 trillion) than the entire Latinx population ($2.4 trillion)and 43 more than 70 percent of the Black population combined ($4.41 trillion). While the 44 average wealth of Black people has decreased since the 1980s (as cited earlier), the average wealth of those on Forbes’s list of the 400 wealthiest people increased from $600 million in 1982 (adjusted for inflation) to $8.0billion in 2020.. You might be 45 asking, what does the Forbes 400have to do with monopoly? Well, it is a who’s who of corporate monopolists.

The people on this list are some of the most egregious perpetrators of driving down wages, expanding income inequality, degrading the health of workers, desecrating the environment, fleecing consumers, perpetuating racial residential segregation, driving community disinvestment, avoiding taxes, and corrupting our democracy. These monopolists utilize ruthless business practices to perpetuate their unquenchable thirst for maximized profits and for control of major segments of the US economy—and people of color bear the brunt.

America’s Legacy of Racism Drives and Sustains Corporate Concentration

The confluence of monopoly power and racial inequality is not new. The construction of an economy that relies on unchecked capitalism to create the modern-day monopolist relies on the construction and maintenance of America’s racial caste system. The legacy of theft, exclusion, and exploitation of people of color by corporate monopolists has been with us since the founding of the nation. In fact, prior to the Civil War, southern plantation owners were the equivalent of the modern-day Fortune 500 monopolists. The Mississippi Valley had more millionaires per capita than anywhere in the country, making it the Silicon Valley of that period. Prior to the Civil War, the combined value of America’s approximately 4 million slaves was $3.5 billion, making it the largest single financial asset in the entire economy, bigger than all manufacturing and railroads combined.46

As the roots of this problem run deep and disproportionately impact people of color, so too must the solutions. Today’s corporate monopolies are built on the foundation of an economy that also stole land from Indigenous people through genocide and forced removal, and built a labor market on the bodies of enslaved Black people. Nothing in our economy is race-neutral, including our work to dismantle monopoly power and the racial wealth inequality it causes, so we must seek race-conscious solutions.

Scholars have developed a catalogue of research confirming what many people of color experience on a daily basis: Corporations have seized control of many aspects of our lives that were once intended to serve the public good over private sector interests. Examples include the growth of charter schools and for-profit colleges as an alternative to public schools; the growth of private health insurance and private hospitals; the growth of private prisons and paid services in prison, such as phone calls and health care. However, more research is needed that connects the economic conditions of people of color to the growth of monopoly power, a call to action we further explore in Section 6.

Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements

There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities.

To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48

Corporate monopolists, including big banks, big tech, and big pharma, are often primary opponents in the battles for bold, transformational movement priorities. For example, activists for bold environmental justice policies, such as the Green New Deal, have encountered strong opposition from fossil fuel monopolies, such as Exxon, Shell and BP; but also, Wall Street bank monopolies financing fossil fuel monopolies, in addition to other monopolies in the airline industry. In another example, Wall Street 49 monopolies have aggressively clashed with affordable housing advocates as their investments have displaced residents of color from their homes and businesses and have also gentrified communities of color from Harlem to Oakland and Detroit to New Orleans. Directly challenging the monopoly power of these corporations could prove to be a useful tactic for activists of color to further movement priorities.

## Case

### Case---1NC

#### Affirmation of theft signifies a resignation to the inevitability of capitalism---the 1AC implicitly adopts an anarchist theory of change that cedes the state and the economy to organized capital---that precludes emergence of a revolutionary socialist movement capable of taking power and rendering mutual aid unnecessary.

Thomas Hummel 20, activist and a member of Marx 21, 6/29/20, “Mutual Aid Networks: Toward a Constructive Critique,” <https://marx21us.org/2020/06/29/mutual-aid-networks-toward-a-constructive-critique/>

Many of the best activists are currently involved in mutual aid work. The extent to which I understand the importance of these organizations is illustrated by my involvement with the one in my neighborhood where I’ve helped with grocery runs for undocumented immigrants and donated some of my stimulus money to keep the organization going. The organization in my neighborhood has raised over $30,000 and has delivered food and essential aid to an impressive number of our neighbors.

While these efforts are incredibly important, we cannot forget that they should be unnecessary. Capitalism and the state that supports it are responsible for a situation in which millions are suffering from privation. In this crisis, the state has been primarily concerned with the maintenance and health of capitalism and has provided only scraps to the vast majority, even as it spends generously to rescue the wealthy. Mutual aid groups have formed to fill this void left by the state’s total disregard for the survival of the most vulnerable.

But since these projects often depend upon us sharing our meager resources, they can be very difficult to maintain. The group in my neighborhood, for example, despite its impressive fundraising, is having difficulty continuing its efforts as new donations dry up. If the left were organized and strong, instead of having to scramble to provide these resources for ourselves, we would be able to apply material pressure and demand them from the state and the wealthy elite that the state protects.

Origins of mutual aid

Looking at the origins of mutual aid philosophy is illuminating. Mutual aid derives from the political philosophy of Anarchism. The term “mutual aid” comes from the anarchist Peter Kropotkin’s 1902 book of the same name, which sought to explore how cooperation, what Kropotkin called “mutual aid,” was “a factor in evolution.”

The issue at hand bears some similarity to a debate going back to the mid-19th century between Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon was a utopian socialist and the father of modern anarchism. Proudhon believed that a new, post-capitalist society could be created alongside capitalism and slowly grow to the point where it became dominant. This process, he believed, could happen in a decentralized way. Marx, by contrast, judged that the capitalist state would never allow this to happen, and would attempt to destroy and undermine these forms of collective care. He argued that the state must be challenged with a fighting organization of the working class. This organized resistance can put pressure on the state and the wealthy, forcing them to provide resources that ordinary people need. But, for Marx, a better society could only come when our forms of organization were strong enough to directly confront the state and replace it with something better.

What’s at stake today is something similar. While acts of solidarity and mutual aid organizations are extremely important, there are limits to what they can achieve inside capitalist society. Organized solidarity entails not just sharing our limited resources between ourselves, but fighting to take them from the rich, whether directly, or indirectly through political demands on the capitalist state. In order for this to be a political movement, and not just a form of charity, organized acts of solidarity and demands on the state need to be made in ways that build class consciousness and organization.

Many socialists have taken on the language and strategy of mutual aid wholesale. In doing so they have unconsciously adopted an anarchist theory of social change and the state. The anarchist theory argues that placing demands on the state only recognizes its authority, strengthens it, and weakens the workers’ movement. Revolutionary socialists, by contrast, share the anarchist opposition to the capitalist state, but think the anarchist approach of ignoring or attempting to circumvent the state is wrong. We believe that the organized working class must engage with and make demands upon the state, while avoiding the social democratic trap of working exclusively through the state, and relying on its reforms. Workers can only achieve a better society by building it for ourselves, brick-by-brick, from the bottom up.

For instance, revolutionary socialists, anarchists, and social democrats can work together with tenants in supporting realistic rent strikes during this time of mass unemployment, and mutual defense against evictions—sometimes cited as a form of mutual aid. But it is also a political act to extend these pressures to demands on the state for a blanket end to evictions, and for rent and mortgage cancellation or moratoriums.

Mutual aid and class struggle at work

“Occupy Sandy” provides a revealing illustration of the merits and limitations of mutual aid work. During the hurricane, a number of New York activists previously involved with “Occupy Wall Street” organized themselves into “Occupy Sandy” around a politics of “mutual aid, not charity.” The group was involved in a lot of important work and provided crucial help to people who were impacted by the storm. However, the political distinction between mutual aid and charity was not always clear to those giving or receiving aid. And despite all its impressive efforts, getting the electricity back on and the subways running ultimately depended upon the state. When the crisis ended, the group left no form of organization behind.

The scale of the crisis today is orders of magnitude larger than it was during the hurricane in 2012, and a much larger portion of the working class has been impacted. The government is currently spending trillions of dollars to prop up banks and corporations. Working people, who create all the wealth in society, need to be getting a share of that. We need to develop strategies that not only spread our limited resources around, but reappropriate what the wealthy have taken from us.

Labor unions, where working people are organized and have leverage against the bosses and corporations, are crucial in the battle for wealth redistribution. An illustrative example comes from the experience of workers in the airline industry. The recent bailout provided the industry with $75 billion. When workers learned this was happening, they organized to ensure that this money would go to help workers and their families get through the crisis. The Flight Attendants Association, led by Sara Nelson, was able to force the airlines into setting aside $29 billion for their workers. This will help pay salaries through the end of September. In a commendable display of solidarity, the union fought for a portion of this aid to go to airport workers as well. The airline workers displayed a willingness to use their power to secure what they needed from their employers. More union actions like this—especially if they were to include greater direct involvement from rank-and-file airline workers—could not only win important material gains, but would also strengthen working class self-organization for future battles against the state and corporations.

Combative social movements will get us the goods

In order to be effective, resistance cannot be the province of a revolutionary minority alone. Since capitalism is creative to the same degree that it is destructive, it tends to breed resistance among people of all walks of life — revolutionary and non-revolutionary alike. It is the role of revolutionaries not to take over these movements, but to intervene and fight alongside those affected in order to win them over to revolutionary politics. Mutual aid networks can be a starting point for people who are radicalizing, but they are most effective when connected to wider movements for change, not seen as an end unto themselves.

We need to build social movements that strive not only to redistribute the few resources available to us, but which also work to reappropriate from the rich the wealth they have taken from us. These movements can translate material pressure into material resources for the majority. They can secure concessions such as medicare-for-all and the inclusion of the undocumented in government aid programs. Bernie Sanders had proposed $2,000 per month for everyone for the duration of the crisis. This is a proposal that combative mass social movements could have the power to actually secure.

Organization, defined as mass involvement, solidarity, and unity-in-action toward a common goal, is the only tool that can give us enough power to take on capital and the state. Without it, we risk just papering over the cracks in capitalism. Only with this tool can we move toward a society based not upon mindless profit for a few, but upon meeting the needs of all. This will allow us to eliminate the conditions that make mutual aid groups necessary, and construct a society based upon solidarity.

#### Their purist stance excludes the possibility of contingent endorsement of state action in particular contexts---turns case and ensures material violence. Cost-benefit analysis of particular policies strengthens anarchist praxis without broadly endorsing the state.

Gearóid Brinn 20, PhD Candidate at the University of Melbourne and Research Assistant at La Trobe University, “Smashing the State Gently: Radical Realism and Realist Anarchism”, European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 19, Number 2, p. 206-227

In the radical context, the statement ‘politics is about power’ challenges not only a perspective that neglects this insight, but one that expressly rejects it. There is a major tendency in contemporary anarchism and anarchist-influenced radicalism that explicitly presents as ‘anti-power’ (Marshall, 2010: 679; Meltzer, 1993: 11), and anti-realist (Holloway, 2005: 18). This approach proposes disengagement and defection from the status quo with the implied expectation that capitalism and the state could wither away through lack of support and without confrontation.9 Realist anarchists oppose this view and argue that realistic efforts to ‘change the world’ unavoidably entail the acquisition and exercise of some forms of power (Mueller, 2003: 128); that the state and capitalism will not disappear without confrontation (Rai, 2015: 177); and that ignoring the current mechanisms of power in the hope that they will go away is not a realistic strategy for radical social change (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425).

For a realist anarchist the statement ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ similarly holds its greatest relevance as a corrective to a mainstream position in radical thought across its history including in the contemporary milieu. Orthodox Marxism, and many of its descendants, held to a long-term vision of a communist utopia where conflict had been reconciled and politics as such had been replaced by ‘the administration of things’ (Adamiak, 1970: 16). Many contemporary anarchists share a similar vision of a post-revolutionary utopia where conflict has been eradicated and where decision-making systems that allow for ongoing disagreement are replaced with those that accept only consensus (see Graeber, 2013: 210–231). Some, like the anti-power tendency discussed above, go beyond the expectation of a future without disagreement and presume the absence of conflict even in the realisation of their utopia. Here ‘everybody’ is made aware of the pressing need for radical social change either through rational argument, or by a sudden realisation or change of consciousness based on the recognition that ‘we are all one’ and have universal shared interests.10 So the realist anarchist perspective on the idea that ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ is not that conflict is universal and inescapable as with the conservative take, but that conflict cannot be completely eradicated, and that no future post-revolutionary society will be free from antagonisms (Edgley, 2000: 73). Nor does the radical interpretation imply that we must forgo radical aims for an uneasy acceptance of pluralism under a liberal democratic modus vivendi. The realist anarchist perspective, however, is not primarily directed at these conservative defences of dictatorship, or at liberal realist pessimism. Instead it is aimed at anarchists and other radicals who see the possibility of a conflict-free utopia, and propose confrontation-free strategies for its realisation that are based either on withdrawing from political struggle, or on successfully convincing all, through education and rational argument, that the proposed radical alternative is in their best interest. The realist anarchist interpretation means that direct and active struggle for positive change, and against oppression, are necessary; that they will continue to be in any future society; and that future visions and current strategies should reflect this (Edgley, 2000: 73; Gordon, 2007: 64–68).

The idea that political thought should be ‘concrete and oriented towards action’ (Geuss, 2008: 95) stands in opposition to anarchist theory that focuses on the articulation of a comprehensive vision of an alternative system of social organisation, with the implied belief that the mere articulation of such a vision should be enough to bring about its realisation. It also counters anarchist perspectives that present as a position of permanent critique without any attempt, or serious belief, that an alternative could actually be achieved, or those similar (in practice) perspectives which posit a revolutionary future based on awaiting some precondition that precipitates radical social change, such as the spontaneous collapse of capitalism due to the unfolding of an inevitable process (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425; 2014 [1924]a: 461).

This entails recognising the imperfectability of radical action and rejecting ‘purist’ revolutionary perspectives. Realist anarchism recognises that all action ‘before the revolution’ is necessarily and unavoidably compromised. Anticapitalists must survive and resist under capitalism while subject to its demands, yet this does not entail that they cannot take any action against it that is not a direct and immediate contribution to the ‘final revolution’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1922] b: 432–433; Rai, 2015: 180). While many anarchists disdain any and all forms of political action that could be construed as reformist, realist anarchists accept that reformism is unavoidable in radical politics. This should not be taken to suggest that realist anarchists exclusively advocate, or even particularly prioritise, reformism. They still, as anarchists, advocate a ‘diversity of tactics’, from prefigurative construction of radical institutions and direct action against oppression, to insurrection and revolution. And as realists they determine the appropriate form of action according to context.

They also argue that, as anarchism is not a fixed idea but a ‘living force’ that constantly responds to and creates ‘new conditions’ (Goldman, 1969: 70), there will always be a need for struggle against oppression, and vigilance against exclusion and subjugation, even after the seemingly most comprehensive and progressive revolutionary change. Any revolution then can only ever be partial, and there can never be a ‘final’ phase of radical social change (Gordon, 2007: 67; Malatesta,2014 [1922]a: 427). Therefore, purist opposition to all reformist struggle is based on an unrealistic hard division between reform and revolution, as revolutions can themselves be seen as ‘the radical reform of institutions, achieved rapidly’ (Malatesta, 1965: 82). So while recognising the importance of revolutionary rupture and upheaval, they also argue that between such events radicals should take ‘all possible reforms with the same spirit that one tears occupied territory from the enemy’s grasp in order to go on advancing’ (Malatesta, 1965: 83).

However, to the extent that realist anarchists endorse reform, they do so only under certain conditions. Firstly, they support reforms that have the capacity to move directly towards radical goals, or to position for future radical gains. To this end they sometimes invoke a distinction similar to that between ‘reformist’ and ‘non-reformist’ reforms articulated by Andre Gorz. Gorz (1967) argued, in relation to labour reforms, that some reforms can have the effect of securing the status quo and others can in fact challenge the status quo and serve as progressive steps towards radical change. Likewise, Malatesta claimed that reforms:

either consolidate the existing regime or undermine it; assist the advent of revolution or hamper it and benefit or harm progress in general, depending on their specific characteristic, the spirit in which they have been granted, and above all, the spirit in which they are asked for, claimed or seized by the people. (Malatesta, 1965: 81)

This distinction has also been employed by various others in relation to issues such as prison abolition (Gilmore, 2007: 183), ecosocialist transformation (Baer, 2017) and the generalised radicalisation of democratic institutions (Mouffe, 2018). The realist anarchist application of this approach will be outlined in more detail in the following section.

Secondly, realist anarchists endorse reforms that can have a direct effect on alleviating suffering and hardship. They argue that anarchist opposition to all forms of oppression demands support for efforts towards the effective amelioration of its effects, even if by means of reforms that originate from or are implemented by ultimately illegitimate institutions (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 472–473). This position also rejects the ‘worse is better’ stance of crude radicalism which accepts inaction against suffering in the hope that it will lead to a crisis that precipitates widespread revolution (Chomsky, 2005: 213). For realist anarchists then the directive that political thought should be ‘concrete, and oriented towards action’ counters radical theory focused on articulating alternative social models without considering their implementation, or which counsels inaction in anticipation of a prophesied perfect moment for enacting a total, final revolution. As we will see in the following section, these positions have particular relevance to the realist anarchist approach to managing the tension between extremely radical goals and realistic strategy and analysis.

The directive that we should recognise the importance of history, contingency and context in political thought (Baderin, 2014: 144; Rossi and Sleat, 2014: 7) also has particular radical interpretations and implications. The acceptance that ‘politics is historically located’ (Geuss, 2008: 13) might inspire recognition of moments of historical rupture – of reform, revolt and revolution – and serve as a reminder of the constancy of social change, the ubiquity of resistance against illegitimate authority and that society could be radically otherwise (Chomsky, 1996: 85–86). This perspective on historical contingency is also relevant to one of the most longstanding disagreements in revolutionary thought. Anarchists have long opposed the teleological view of history associated with orthodox Marxism, and contemporary anarchists especially reaffirm the contingency of historical processes, and that history does not unfold according to a predetermined schedule (Wigger, 2016: 134). For realist anarchists this means that radicals must act – they must recognise their agency in history and that there is nothing necessary about the currently dominant social, political and economic forms, nor anything inevitable about revolutionary change.

This action, however, must recognise and respond to context. Realist anarchists ‘cannot impose an iron-clad program or method on the future’ but must ‘leave posterity to develop its own particular systems, in harmony with its needs’ (Goldman, 1969: 49). There cannot be a single revolutionary strategy or utopian model that is generally applicable regardless of political, economic, historical and cultural contexts. Radical action and efforts towards social change must conform to particular, contingent requirements (Malatesta, 2014 [1924]b: 453). For those committed to radically democratic and generally emancipatory politics, this implies that the details of radical actions and organisational models that apply in particular contexts that action must conform to are not merely to be determined by elites, but by the democratic self-determination of the peoples within those contexts (Chomsky, 2005: 221–222; Turcato, 2015: 217–218). So for a realist anarchist the recognition of context also calls radicals to humility – to the acceptance that the detailed construction of universal models of (even radical) democracy by intellectual elites goes beyond the legitimate set of tasks that a radical political theorist can undertake.

One tenet within the recent re-articulation of realism in political theory might appear an insurmountable obstacle to the reconciliation of anarchist radicalism and the realist disposition. Both radical and liberal realists in the recent realist discourse argue against an ‘ethics-first’ approach to political theory (Geuss, 2008: 9; Williams, 2005). An ethics-first approach to political theory is described as the view that ‘politics is applied ethics’ – where a priori ethical principles are first determined and politics subsequently framed as the application of those principles. Those familiar with standard representations of anarchism would be forgiven for assuming that all forms of anarchism are based on just such an ethics-first approach. Anarchism is often defined as the application of the principle that all authority is illegitimate (e.g. Newman, 2015: 1–2). Many anarchists also advocate a purist application of this position which equates to the implementation of the implicit principle ‘never engage with, or endorse with cooperation, any illegitimate institution’ which is clearly a non-realist moralistic principle on the order of Kant’s ‘never lie even to save a life’ (Kant in Geuss, 2008: 8). This position is indeed prevalent in contemporary anarchism. It is associated with the stance suggested above by the non-realist perspectives that realist anarchist positions are often levelled against (i.e. the anarchist tendency which aims for a conflict-free utopia through universalist strategies that neglect considerations of power, history and context).

Realist anarchism, however, is not the application of a moral belief that all coercion is immoral or that all authority is illegitimate, nor does it proceed from an a priori moral principle of any kind. Instead, realist anarchism is based on a sceptical stance towards all authority based on a realist appreciation of one of the qualities that humans appear to exhibit across history and independent of culture. That is, that people generally do not seem to accept being controlled, dominated and oppressed, and history suggests that the attempt to do so will usually draw some form of resistance and, in time, be seen as an illegitimate form of authority. Rather than a moral or ethical principle, this is a realist observation much like that which sees humans as driven not only by rational calculation, and this insight is similarly derived from the interpretations of the central tenets of a realist disposition described above. Attention to history, the actual realities that drive people to political action, the ubiquity of resistance, struggle and change, lead realist anarchists to see it as a realistic and pragmatic stance to be sceptical towards all forms of authority11 (Chomsky, 1970: viii). Though they may seem similar, complete opposition is importantly distinct in its implications when compared with scepticism towards all forms of authority. Scepticism entails that the onus of proof should be placed on those that see unequal power relations as legitimate, and no form of authority should be considered immune from the requirement to justify its necessity on the terms of those subject to it. It also entails, however, the recognition that some forms of authority can indeed be accepted as legitimate, and beyond this, that even illegitimate institutions and practices can, under some circumstances, be considered relatively acceptable when compared with other currently available alternatives (Chomsky, 1996: 73–74).

This scepticism is levelled not at one form of authority, such as the state, but at all forms, and it is combined with a concrete, action-orientated realist perspective which, in its radical iteration, entails immediate opposition to oppression rather than awaiting a teleological unfolding of history or the idea that ‘the worse, the better’ for radical politics (Chomsky, 2005: 213). Therefore, the realist anarchist perspective recognises the unavoidable tension in radical positions which oppose various forms of illegitimate authority simultaneously. Rather than proceeding according to the application of a moralistic principle such as ‘never engage with an illegitimate institution’, the realist anarchist must compare and balance tensions between their oppositions to different forms of illegitimate authority according to the particular historical and political contexts. This weighing of relative priority between opposition to different forms of illegitimate authority, for example those associated with capitalism and the state, leads realist anarchists to perhaps their most controversial and challenged stance – a nuanced and pragmatic approach to the state. As noted, there are anarchists who advocate the complete withdrawal and disengagement from formal political institutions, and propose a future radical alternative based on absolutely no formal political structures. Realist anarchism is not one of these forms of radical thought. The nuanced realist anarchist stance towards political institutions and engagement with them is, as we will see in the next section, central to understanding realist anarchism as an actually-existing form of realism that is based on both an unflinchingly realistic attitude to political thought and action, as well as a far-reaching, utopian radicalism that calls for social change that appears, in current contexts, to be patently impossible.

Demanding the impossible while being realistic: Anarchism within the state

In my view, the state is an illegitimate institution. But it does not follow from that that you should not support the state. (Chomsky, 2005: 212)

While anarchism is sometimes portrayed as little more than an uncompromising opposition to the state (e.g. Wolff, 1970), a nuanced approach to the state is the most contentious element of the tendency that I have been referring to as realist anarchism. It is implicitly affirmed by some (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473; Shantz, 2010: 85–86), and explicitly but without emphasis by others (Gordon, 2007: 154–155). However, those who have openly and defiantly stated this position (Chomsky, 1996) or have been perceived as doing so (Bookchin, 1998) have courted denunciation and ‘excommunication’ by other anarchists.12 This approach to formal political institutions, and the state in particular, is drawn from a fairly obvious logical extrapolation of opposition to all forms of oppression including both the state and capitalism, and the insistence that oppression must be actively resisted rather than ignored in the hope that a teleological process will deliver emancipation. Simply then, the realist anarchist does not consider the state to be a legitimate institution, yet still holds that some actions of the state can be positive when they are directed at preventing a relatively greater oppression imposed by another form of illegitimate authority. The primary way that the realist anarchist argues that the state can sometimes be considered relatively legitimate (or at least a ‘lesser evil’) is in relation to the tension between opposing both contemporary capitalism and the state simultaneously. There are two main ways that realist anarchists argue this tension can lead to anarchist engagement with, and support for, the state: for protecting people from pressing negative social effects of capitalism (Rai, 2015: 180); and to reform current social, political and economic institutions in accordance with radical goals, or to position radical movements to move further towards radical goals in the most realistic manner possible (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]b: 433).

Anarchist involvement in local social organising has imbued the contemporary milieu with a keen awareness of the relatively positive effect of state-based social services considering the increase in suffering created by their withdrawal. Therefore, in recent decades under widespread neoliberal political and ideological hegemony, anarchists have often opposed privatisation of public services and other state-owned enterprises (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). Their sensitivity to social issues also leads many contemporary anarchist groups to enter into alliances with nonanarchist radical and non-radical community and activist groups, including single-issue reformist campaigns that call directly on the state for social provisions, in order to more effectively tackle issues of marginalisation, inequality and hardship (Gordon, 2007: 58–59). In fact, in the context of several decades of leftist retreat and defeat, including the privatisation of essential industries and social services, some anarchist organisations openly support re-nationalisation efforts (MacSimoin, 2007; Van Der Walt, 1996). Realist anarchists then prefer state control of means of production when the alternative is private ownership and, in the wake of decades of privatisation, support re-nationalisation as they see publiclyowned industries as more advantageous sites from which to agitate for direct worker control – a long-held anarchist organisational goal (Marshall, 2010: 7–9).

In contrast to the stereotypical depiction of anarchism, then, realist anarchists avoid simplistic slogans like ‘smashing the state’ and emphasise the replacement of illegitimate institutions rather than their simple destruction – ‘we must not destroy anything that satisfies human need, however badly – until we have something better to put in its place’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473). This position entails efforts towards the prefigurative construction of such alternatives, and indeed much of the energy of contemporary anarchist movements is dedicated to such efforts (see e.g. Shantz, 2010). However, it also recognises the relatively positive use of state power that many anarchists are reluctant to admit explicitly but that realist anarchists openly acknowledge (Bookchin, 1979: 29; Chomsky, 2002: 344; Gordon, 2007: 154). So, their recognition of the tension between opposing the oppression and suffering induced by capitalism while simultaneously opposing the state drives realist anarchists away from purist disengagement with the state and towards acceptance of the need to support reformist measures against oppression and suffering.

This engagement with the state is not only accepted in order to combat the social symptoms of capitalism in a passive form of harm-minimisation that has given up on the possibility of far-reaching radical social change, but it is also endorsed as a method to pursue such change. So while realist anarchists argue that state control of social services is preferable when the alternative is neoliberal privatisation and for-profit services, they also see a flawed but somewhat democratic state system as a better platform for achieving their revolutionary goals of social, political and economic re-organisation, including the long-term goal of state transformation and replacement, than a state weakened in its social and economic roles, and dominated by corporate capitalism (Chomsky, 2005: 213; Shantz, 2010: 86).

While realist anarchists, as anarchists, do not advocate establishing ‘anarchist parties’ or directly pursuing state control, they do recognise the pluralism of the radical milieu and accept that other radicals will indeed pursue party-based political control. However, when they can contribute to either diminishing a currently pressing form of oppression, delivering ‘radical reforms’ or positioning radical movements for further gains, realist anarchists advocate supporting radical party-based efforts (Malatesta, [2014 [1924]a: 420, 426–427). Therefore, realist anarchist recognition of the tension between radical opposition to intersecting and even competing forms of oppression extends to support for an activity usually considered wholly contrary to the anarchist position: engagement with representative electoral politics through voting (Chomsky, 2005: 241; Gordon, 2007: 120). This does not mean, however, that realist anarchists forego their opposition to the state. They maintain their philosophical objection to, and rejection of, the state, and also maintain the seemingly impossible demand for its replacement as the primary unit of large-scale political organisation.

Despite this uncompromised goal, however, realist anarchists recognise the need to engage with current political realities, such as dominant institutions, in pursuit of radical change. Therefore, they attempt to devise strategies that can employ the state in efforts towards its own replacement with alternate forms of democratic organisation (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). These strategies, of course, are not universal but conform to contingent and particular political, historical, and cultural contexts. For example, a revolutionary movement in ‘Rojava’, Northern Syria, is currently pursuing one such strategy in the midst of the Syrian civil war.13 The revolutionary reorganisation of the Middle East called ‘democratic confederalism’ proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK (Partiya € Karkereˆn Kurdistaneˆ – Kurdistan Workers’ Party), is an adaptation of the anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin’s14 approach to radical strategy (Biehl, 2015: 315–317). Ocalan argues that radical movements in the Middle East should organise into federated autonomous enclaves within the shells of already internationally recognised nation-states, and use the legislative and constitutive power of the state to ratify and legalise these federated structures of radically democratic, feminist and eco-socialist enclaves (Stanchev, 2016). In the long term, the strategy aims towards the expansion of this model to neighbouring states, at which point these allied national federated structures could further integrate into a regional bloc of democratic self-organisation that has replaced the state form (Ocalan, 2011).

Other strategies are suggested in other contexts. Chomsky, for instance, advocates a democratic approach to radical change, in part due to his appraisal that modern western societies have such overwhelmingly powerful and violently repressive state apparatuses that armed revolution is not a realistic strategy within them (Chomsky in Rai, 2015: 177). Instead, he endorses Andre´ Gorz’s ‘non-reformist reform’ approach in which certain reforms are considered potential paths to further radical change (Edgley, 2015: 8). The implementation of workplace and/or community democracy through direct action at the site in question, combined with support from democratic legislative and constitutional control, is given as an example of non-reformist reform (Gorz, 1967: 8n, 60–62). Realist anarchists see this approach as capable of being extended further, to the radicalisation and democratisation of the institutions of democratic organisation and decisionmaking, to the point where the state is democratically transformed into some other form of large-scale political entity15 (Chomsky, 1996: 75). Realist anarchists do not see this as a short-term strategy that can be achieved in a single step, and neither do they suggest that it could or should be accomplished by anarchists alone (realist or otherwise), but by a broad, diverse, radical milieu with largely shared goals. Within such a ‘movement of movements’, constituted by a respect for internal difference and disagreement, realist anarchists can advance their case for a realistic democratic strategy for the achievement of radical ends (Gordon, 2007: 59; Malatesta,2014 [1925]b: 466–467).

These are obviously not direct and immediate, or guaranteed, paths to an anarchist future, and that is the point. Realist anarchists do not hold to a detailed vision of a particular radical alternative, nor to one particular strategy to achieve it, but instead move as realistically as possible from current conditions towards a seemingly impossible radical goal that by necessity must become fully defined in its realisation (Rai, 2015: 179). So, in contrast with the stereotypical image of anarchist destruction of the state, realist anarchists wish to replace the state through its radical democratisation, supported, ratified and generalised by democratic control of the state and its re-constitutive powers. Therefore, rather than the typical pessimism associated with realism, realist anarchism implies a comparatively optimistic stance towards the possibility of radical change. And in contrast to the pessimism suggested by radicals who maintain their ideological purity through inaction and uncompromising disengagement, realist anarchists are optimistic enough about the possibility of actually achieving seemingly impossible radical goals that they endeavour to be realistic about what it would take to move towards those goals from current conditions.

#### Advocating theft as political methodology terminates in futility. Recognition by and transformation of state power is the only productive path to emancipation.

Natasha King 16, Taught at the University of Nottingham and Caseworker with the British Refugee Council, No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance, p. 39-42

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy ever entirely autonomous? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s unrealistic to talk about creating wholly autonomous social structures because ‘[t]he second they’re consequential is the second they’ll be noticed [by the state]. At that point, it becomes impossible to break the cycle of antagonism by will alone. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are rarely (if ever) entirely free from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are rarely able to ignore that antagonism. We may antagonize the state, but we are forced also to respond to the state, as a form of self-defence. This has happened time and time again, from the steady illegalization of squatting in Europe, and the tightening of laws around private property, to the infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement, to the struggle between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed. Whether people have been forced to, or they have seen it as the best strategy, the history of struggles for liberation has been one that included demands on the state. Often this has taken the form of engagement in a politics of rights and/or recognition. From the movement of the Sans Papiers in France, to ‘a Day without Migrants’ in the USA; from campaigns that fight against the detention and deportation of people without papers, to struggles against police violence, resistance through forms of visible collective action have been central to struggles against the border. In most cases such struggles have made demands on the state, particularly through seeking recognition as a group, and through making claims to rights. But to what extent are demands for rights and/or recognition part of a no borders politics? Demands for rights and recognition have played a big part in the struggle for the freedom of movement. Yet there has been a long history of criticism over the politics of citizenship. Rights claims, for example, have been seen as essentially reinforcing the role of the state as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and reinforcing the notion that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who fit certain descriptions of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a famously exclusionary concept, and its exclusionary force is there by design. The exclusions of citizenship are immanent to its logic, and not at all accidental. Citizenship is meant to produce successful and unsuccessful subjects. Citizenship, in other words, is “designed to fail”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31). Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a bordering technology that seeks to pacify and discipline expressions of autonomy (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is problematic because it only ever brings people into the state. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219). I have a lot of sympathy with these arguments, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. But when it comes to actual practices of struggle against the border, a resolute stand against such strategies seems naïve, and insulting to those who have taken part. Migrant-led struggles have often been claims for rights, and ultimately I don’t want to dismiss such practices because they are philosophically problematic. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the only available strategy in situations of extreme vulnerability, where people’s options are highly limited. Recognizing that we are in relations of power right now means also recognizing that our situation is imperfect and that we have to struggle in our (imperfect) reality. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we must engage with the state in order to bring about greater freedoms now. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression. A no borders politics seeks to go beyond claims to representation and rights that ultimately stand to reinforce the state. But claims to representation and rights can sometimes do this too. Building on Foucault’s idea that power can be both positive and empowering or negative and dominating, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that refuses totalizing visions of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, within existing power relations (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation only ever brings people into power therefore means rejecting a vast range of moments when the oppressed have voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the Black Panthers to the Sans Papiers, demands for representation, when carried out by minority groups for themselves, can challenge the role of dominant power over that group and create new, emancipated subjectivities (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a radical and transformative political act (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original)

#### Their method of resistance is too ephemeral and can’t escape the academy

Heather Love 15, R. Jean Brownlee Term Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary”, differences 2015 Volume 26, Number 1: 74-95

Today, queer studies—prestigious but unevenly institutionalized—still signals absolute refusal or criticality—all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration. Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against professional and disciplinary protocols. To offer an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification—recognition, description, critique—can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense. Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines—and the production of knowledge about social deviance—are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history—we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed—in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102)—may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

#### Racialization is an exercise of power that exists contingently. Changing it depends on interest group competition and creating new opportunities. They gloss over the meaningful change this can produce.

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Fortunately, to the extent that the present global capitalistic system is the ultimate structure supporting regress in internal US progress toward social justice for African Americans, resignation is not the only realistic or prudent response. A global system works on many institutional levels of governmental and economic structure, including its injustice as experienced by real people who suffer from it in their concrete daily existence. And it is that kind of individually experienced injustice, which can be addressed, on the ground. It may not be (as Alexander and West have, respectively, called for and proclaimed to have begun) that even a movement is necessary or sufficient in order to address specific contemporary experiences of injustice. It may be that tangible practical first steps can be taken on the level of local activism and it may be that in societies with democratic structures, such activism is more effective than the promulgation of liberatory global system theory'. If local problems are corrected without at the same time calling for a new national or global movement, there may be less political opposition on local levels. We will return to this question of “scope of activism” in the next section, after more theoretical ground has been reclaimed for “what to do.” NEW CONSTRUCTIONS OF RACE Global understanding is important—we are all required to be informed about the world—but it is not the only worthwhile theoretical goal. Theory and analysis are also important for developing ideas for how to correct injustice on concrete, specific levels. Under-examined in the construction of revisionist history, as well as in the idea of regress, is a circular theory of human history. We seem to go ahead, and then we go back. But what could it mean to “go back”? No one has claimed that the present or recent past duplicates the more distant past or literally replays it. Although, some scholars have claimed that some structures of status are remarkably resilient, even though the principles defending them have been rejected. For example, the idea that nonwhites are inferior to whites and need to be kept separate from them for the benefit of both groups has been abandoned as an explicit, official justification for racial segregation, but racial segregation—in US housing, education, and social life—has not been abandoned. (Residential segre- gation continues without legal requirement as the result of real estate prices, sedimented social practices, poverty, and mortgage lenders who redline.) Rival Siegel argues that status arrangements may persist with complete legality after their original justificatory principles are struck down, so long as different justifications are concocted: The wavs in which the legal system enforces social stratification are various and evolve over time, Efforts to reform a status regime bring about changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric—a dynamic I have elsewhere called ’preservation-through-transforma-tion,“ In short, status-enforcing state action evolves in form as it is contested.22 Siegel's thesis raises the question of what kind of thing or relation the original social stratification is, so that it can persist from generation to generation under different names, with different justifications. The social metaphysics could involve “memes,” or intergenerational habits, or outright lies and conspiracies. Perhaps there are power relationships between blacks and whites that members of each group inherit and whites are loathe to give up, because they have more power. To relate the present to the past in such ways is a complex interdisciplinary work consisting at least of sociology, history, and legal and political history, before philosophers and other theorists could formulate their own disciplinary interpretations. It may be simpler and more conclusive to approach this issue of permanent-status-through-change by starting fresh with present power and status differences. When Alexander calls the present racially biased prison system “the new Jim Crow,” she adds that she does not mean to draw a literal comparison, but to write metaphorically.23 This raises the question of why we need a metaphor that invokes the past to describe present conditions that are well studied by contemporary social scientists, with events reported by journalists and recorded on video, as they occur. What would happen if we simply stayed with our current best descriptions and attempted to theorize them? One result might be to shift the discourse from a somewhat rigid idea of types of events, a kind of essentializing of history, to the use of more recent tools involving the idea of social construction. It’s already well accepted within the academy that biological human racial divisions, as well as their social meanings, were constructed in the past.24 We also know that biological foundations for human races are now repudiated in the same scientific fields that invented them. That knowledge supports recognition of racial construction within society which was explicitly based on assumed biological determinism in the past. Indeed, one indication of a lack of biological foundation for racial taxonomies in society is the historical and geographic variation of the epistemology of social race. Thus, for example, before they were assimilated into the middle class, Europeans who were Irish, Italian, Jewish, Finnish, Polish, and even German, were not considered white; the ethnic category of Hispanic/Latino was created by the US census and has since been regarded as a race or at least an object of racism; Middle Eastern Americans came to be identified as a nonwhite racial group after 9/11; mixed black and white people are conventionally identified as black. Such social construction of race has always been closely associated with citizenship rights and social status and it has been maintained and changed for changing political and economic purposes. Race and racial divisions should be viewed as constantly “under construction.” Dominant groups may reiterate some general ideas based on their knowledge of history, but their present focus is always on their present goals for dominance. Race as it has been known, and as we continue to know it, is a dynamic process. Consider, for example, Richard Nixon’s reported intentions to appeal to white racists, with language that would not explicitly mention blacks or other nonwhites. The social construction of black men as criminals that has accompanied broad public acceptance of police racial profiling, as well as the racial imbalance in incarceration, has its origins in this early 1970s political rhetoric and policy. That is, our present form of the social construction of black men started as a relatively new, post-civil rights movement strategy for getting votes. This is not to say that the strategy had not been successfully used before then, for instance, as Alexander notes, in extinguishing the late nineteenth-century populist movement.26 But it was a new political strategy for the 1970s. And all that was required to sustain it from then on was a steady increase in the funding and construction of the infrastructure supporting it, and occasional ideological revitalization. For example, in the 1988 presidential campaign, George H. W. Bush used against Michael Dukakis, his Democratic opponent, the example of William "Willie" Horton, a convicted first-degree murderer, Horton committed rape and assault when released on furlough during Dukakis's second term as governor of Massachusetts. In his first term as governor, Dukakis had vetoed a hill that would have stopped furloughs for first-degree murderers. Ergo, Dukakis was portrayed as “soft on crime," and Bush won the election. 27 If we view the social construction of race as an ongoing dynamic process, we need to understand that Nixon and H. W. Bush were not merely manipulating existing public fears about black men, but fanning them, exacerbating them, and giving them new faces—faces from their time, not faces from the late nineteenth century—and in that process reconstructing race. They were not turning the clock back to the beginning of a new era of Jim Crow (no matter how metaphorically that may be understood) but moving forward with new ideas about black male identity. Of course, these ideas were not difficult to “sell” because the paradigm case of black manhood they held up was genuinely scary and the mass of economically insecure white voters was already predisposed to accept a racist ideology. But “predisposed” does not mean “predetermined.” The construction of the idea of the late twentieth-century black male ghetto dweller as an inherently dangerous and later crack-crazed maniac was a newly constructed stereotype. It prompted a whole new generation of nonblack women to clutch their purses when a black man stepped onto elevators with them, and signaled everyone else to click their car doors into “locked” when they saw a black man advancing down the street.28 In turn, these attitudes can be viewed as antecedents to acceptance of the legality of recent high profile cases of police homicide following attempted stops and frisks of unarmed young African American men. Overall, such stereotypes support the criminalization of black male bodies in the public imaginary because those bodies have become icons—they both symbolize criminals and are perceived as physically dangerous. That Willie Horton, who was a violent black male criminal, became the face of black male crime and not any one of hundreds of thousands other black men, who had already been incarcerated for possession of small amounts of marijuana or cocaine, meant and continues to mean, that the preoccupation with crime in America is a locus on physical crime. There is now a prevailing impression that “crime" means “physi- cal violence," so that “white-collar crime" (a term now out of date sarto-rially) is not viewed as truly dangerous. And physical crime is imagined to be mainly perpetrated by black men, an association so strong that being a criminal has become part of the casual identity of being a black male. The quotidian phenomenology of that new construction of race for all black men, especially poor black youth, is nothing less than the phenomenology of traumatic encounters with bullies against whom the victim cannot win—if the victim tries to win, he can be killed by police officers, with impunity.29 I suggest that we view the post—civil rights movement association of crime with African American men and boys as a new construction of race. Alexander names this construction “criminalblackman, 30 but does not sufficiently treat it as a new racial construction. She is aware that something new has occurred, but she views it as an attribute of crime, rather than a reconstruction of black maleness: “For black men, the stigma of being; a ‘criminal’ in the era of mass incarceration is funda- mentally a racial stigma. . . . Whiteness mitigates crime, whereas blackness defines the criminal.”31 Alexander does not tell us what she means by the preexisting “blackness” that defines the criminal. There is no preexisting blackness, except for dark skin and poverty. In this case, “criminal” defines and constructs blackness. And that is why the almost 70 percent of African Americans who are black, but not poor, also suffer from this new construction of “criminal black man.” Such slanderous characterizations of an entire group as dangerously criminal do not directly result from the financial and economic structures of a system of global capitalism, descending like the forefinger of God to shape the minds of the white populace. They are opportunistically discovered by politicians seeking votes, based on their assumptions that their highest good is getting elected, instead of getting elected for the right reasons. (It should go without saying that such politicians cannot be presumed to believe what they say in order to get people to vote for them.) If the politicians get elected, they try out a few new programs. If those on whom the programs are inflicted (e.g., the victims of Reagan’s War on Drugs that followed a general valorization of “law and order”) are already vulnerable to government power and the rest of the population is not vigilant about everyone’s rights, the programs succeed and their growth accelerates in new times of crisis. Such programs will only work if they are able to intersect with existing or bur- geoning corporate interests, in this case, private prison contractors. If the intersection “takes," then soon enough, a criminal justice system such as the one in place is the historical result. It is a historical result because it developed over time and at many different stages its present state could not have been predicted with a high degree of probability. It may therefore be an unduly Manichean use of history to view such a system as a deliberate design by the ultimate architects of global corporate capitalism. That is not to say that individuals, especially poor and nonwhite people, do not encounter the present criminal justice system as both real and unyielding. And it is not to overlook the jobs provided to law enforcement officers, prison personnel, and civilians who prosper from the economic stimulus of prisons in their locales,32 In addition, we should be concerned about Alexander's account of the dire consequences for eligibility for government aid and prospective employment, as well as loss of personal and familial regard, suffered by contemporary felons. Once convicted, or sometimes, even only arrested for minor drug offenses, the poor and especially black victims of this system become branded as lifelong criminals. They are usually barred from both jury duty and voting and are precluded from ever fully rejoining respectable society. Their inability to vote in geographical areas with large poor black populations can tip the results of key elections. Most of the victims and fearful observers are now accustomed to this system, their habits settled within and outside it, as though it were completely natural, “just the way things are.”33 These are terrible conditions of existence for millions of poor black people. However, the question is not whether or not they are related to larger historical trends, which they without question are, but whether the most effective way to address them via activist discourse is to take on the big global picture or focus on comparative ways in which American blacks and whites, poor and middle class, are treated by their—everyone’s—government. The prison-poverty system became an entrenched institution by the mid-1990s. Alexander notes that during the Clinton administration, the prison budget, after increasing by 171 percent, became twice what was allocated to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and that funding for public housing was reduced by 61 percent. At the same time, those who had been convicted for drug offenses were barred from public housing and faced homelessness.34 Described in these terms, the prison-poverty system exceeds the institution of Jim Crow because of its dedicated federal funding. In studying this structure, everything that happens can be described as though it were designed to oppress poor black people, for the benefit of others. But even that description, in addition to its transcendental excess, may rely too much on the net results of contingent, uncertain, incremental components. Moreover, although poor black ghetto dwellers are the main human resources for this system and the rate of poverty among American blacks is twice that among whites, most American blacks, about 75 percent, are not at this time poor ghetto dwellers.35 The majority of American blacks, who are neither poor nor incarcerated are stigmatized and thereby endangered by stereotypes that connect the prison to the ghetto, but they are not directly part of that connection. This does not mean life is not unjust for all African Americans, but it does mean that the majority retains its civic ability to educate the next generation, vote, protest, and cultivate optimism about the future. (A visitor from another planet might wonder if that majority is doing enough to fulfill its civic obligations in the early twenty-first century.) HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BOUNDARIES Unlike Jim Crow, which had mainly excluded blacks from mainstream economic and social life, the post—civil rights criminal justice system initiated positive federal programs that were intended to directly and punitively address African Americans, partly because key people in government believed that was what white Americans wanted. While it seemed at first that affirmative action for middle-class African Americans was a helpful positive program—and it did in fact help many—white backlash attacking it as "reverse discrimination" has curtailed explicit affirmative action policies, under the direction of the US Supreme Court, Antidiscrimination laws remain on the books, but there is little evidence that antidiscrimination lawsuits, since 1980 have been effective. In place of affirmative action there has been a perceived need for racial diversity in organizations and some observers conclude that compliance reviews are more effective than lawsuits tor organizational change, especially in the diversification of management positions. Overall, the twenty years following the success of the civil rights move- ment was a period of regress, which many observers in 2015 consider to remain in full swing. But, what is happening during this period is exactly a competition among interest groups, and as Bentley might have predicted, with no clear-cut resolution yet. It therefore makes sense to consider appropriate time frames with which to think about the current situation of racial injustice. Raymond Williams was a twentieth-century English cultural critic who seems to be largely unknown to US philosophers of race who write about social justice. He was one of the founders of the British New Left Review, but his ideas were a site of contention for more orthodox Marxists, because he was skeptical of economic analyses that did not take lived cultural experience into account. Williams believed that masses, and also perhaps classes, did not literally exist, except for how theorists defined and viewed them. He also anticipated later feminist emphases on "nutritive and generative” aspects of lived experience as a major social institution on a par with the economy and politics. Williams has been considered most influential for his ideas that all members and groups in society contribute to its structured feelings at any given time and for his idea of the long revolution that recurred throughout his writing, after he introduced it in a 1961 book of the same title.37 The Long Revolution named by Williams was a process of social change toward democracy, which began in modernity in the late eighteenth century with the French Revolution, “the mould in which experience was cast."38 By “experience” in this context, Williams meant the experience of writers and poets, and he believed that what was expressed in literature both reflected feelings in society and influenced them. The structured feeling of the Long Revolution is centered on goals of universal human recognition, for all members of society, as whole human beings. Everyone is to be accepted for what they are in the system to come after capitalism: “There can be no acceptable human order while the full humanity of any class of men is in practice denied.”39 In disagreement with contemporary Marxists, Williams was skeptical of the ability of socialism or state control that would entail complex bureaucracy to realize the goal of universal humanity: “We seem reduced to a choice between speculator and bureaucrat and while we do not like the speculator, the bureaucrat is not exactly inviting either.”40 His proposed solution was a form of self-rule based on open discussion and voting, with representatives to larger governing bodies responsible to their constituents. Williams has been interpreted as advocating that “the people” rule themselves, but he is not usually associated with an archism.41 It is very difficult for a theorist to decide how big a picture to consider, how long a period of history to take as a unit for long-term trends. Since we cannot successfully intervene in a global system, and the same facts can usually be explained by more than one theory, there is little that can or should interfere with a long-term view that is tilted toward optimism. The temporal perspective introduced by Williams, although he probably would not have described it in these terms, permits us to think about history as extending into the future, as well as the past.42 Suppose that there is a Long Revolution and there are Wide Humanistic Values to match it, which preclude racism, because the full humanity of all human beings will be recognized, eventually. It might be useful, as a matter of sanity, as well as hope, to see the present conditions of American antiblack punitive racism as a relatively short span of events within those lengths. Such events need to be endured and the hope is that they will pass into the past at some stage in the future of the Long Revolution. About hope, Williams wrote the following at the end of Towards 2000: It is only in a shared belief and insistence that there are practical alternatives that the balance of forces and chances begins to alter.... Once the inevitabilities are challenged, we begin gathering our resources for a journey of hope. If there are no easy answers there are still available and discoverable hard answers and it is these that we can now learn to make and share. This has been, from the beginning, the sense and impulse of the Long Revolution.43 The Elasticity and Inclusiveness of Identities Since the US civil rights movement, African American theorists, academics especially, have emphasized the importance of black identity, in the tradition of W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon. There has been a shift toward prophecy in Cornel West’s sense of speaking the truth about oppression in the present, but overall, the methodological consensus is that improvement in the conditions of African Americans needs to be demanded by and for African Americans, as a racial group. This discourse displays little confidence in human rights or a humani-tarianism such as Williams emphasized, because there is a longstanding belief that many whites have in the Long Oppression failed to recognize the humanity of blacks. Moreover, the language of “color blindness,” which does not mention race, is strongly associated with the regress of post-civil rights movement black poverty and deep experience of injustice in the criminal justice system. However, this view may be too concrete, too focused on short-term historical contingencies, to get us from here to where and how we want the future to be. American politicians have been able for a while to manipulate and implement racism in racially neutral language, which leaves little opportunity for either nonwhite racial affirmation or successful race-based litigation—that is, judges do not accept wholly race-based affirmative action or complaints about antiblack racism in situations that have been already described in race-neutral language, such as the War on Drugs. Nevertheless, it does not follow from any of this that neutrality about race is not a humanistic ideal or that humanistic ideals are not valid general ideals. It may be a self-defeating long-term error, albeit expedient in the short term, to insist that all efforts toward improving the present conditions of poor African Americans be described in terms of their racial identities, rather than their human identities. There are more poor whites than poor blacks or Hispanics in the United States, even though black poverty is twice as common as white poverty and the residential segregation of the black poor creates additional race-associated vulnerabilities.44 African American poor people are more vulnerable to the exploitation of being inducted into the US criminal justice system, as well as more vulnerable in lacking adequate housing, food, a living wage, and public education that provides real opportunities for their children. All of these ills and comparative disadvantages create distinct circumstances of the “blackpoor.” But the condition of poverty itself, where the poor have less income and wealth than those who are not poor, is a measurable condition that includes people of all races, including whites and especially whites who are homeless or unemployed. There has been much debate about whether race or class is more important to consider for understanding the situation of poor African Americans: Does black racial identity in an antiblack racist society predetermine a high likelihood of poverty, which persists over generations as antiblack racism continues? Or, is poverty sufficiently oppressive to account for its own persitence, regardless of race? Does race and racism change the nature of poverty? Or, is pover-ty, like criminality, part of a new black identity? Much can be said in answer to such questions about the theoretical aspects of race or class as a lens for studying the oppression of the blackpoor. Lucius Outlaw has developed a now paradigmatic perspective that historical and contemporary studies of race support a critical theory of race that is more relevant to African American experience than traditional critical theories based on class.45 Still, the question in terms of activism and the correction of concrete social injustice is not how poverty has been caused, but how it can be corrected. (It may have causes mainly in racism but mainly economic corrections.) To correct poverty and attendant issues such as food insecurity and homelessness among children, it neither makes sense, nor is it morally principled, to focus on the poverty of only African Americans. The discourse of social class may not be adequate to account for institutional racism and specifically racist institutions, because there is usually an added element of ignorance, neglect, or malice, concerning blacks. But addressing poverty needs to be an inclusive project. It would not only become another contentious form of “affirmative action” if only the blackpoor were considered, but it would be cruel insofar as the poor of all racial groups suffer. In 1961, at the age of ninety-three, W. E. B. Du Bois joined the Communist Party and then said the following to the New York Times'. “Capitalism cannot reform itself; it is doomed to self-destruction. No universal selfishness can bring social good to all. . . . Communism—the effort to give all men what they need and to ask of each the best they can contribute—this is the only way of human life.”46 Black spokespeo-ple have for many decades emphasized poverty as a primary human problem and not a problem for only black Americans. Martin Luther King Jr. expressed that humanitarian emphasis, as has Cornel West, in our own era. Following his award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, King announced a shift from civil rights to human rights, through his organization of the multiracial Poor People's Campaign. Before he was assassinated in 1968, King envisioned a Poor People's March on Washington, D.C.47 West and Tavis Smiley, in their Poverty Tours, have emphasized the importance of "jobs with a living wage," as a goal for millions of Americans of all races.48 Poverty is also a world concern. In a way similar to this racially inclusive view of poverty, US govern-ment action toward peoples of nonwhite races outside of our borders has been an African American concern, in black liberatory discourse. As early as 1919, nine years after he founded the NAACP, Du Bois organized a second Pan-African Congress in Paris, presenting a petition to the Versailles Peace Conference (or recognition of worldwide peoples’ rights to anticolonialist self-determination. The petition was rejected. Du Bois continued to connect the situation of American blacks with that of global people of color, until the NAACP expelled him in 1948, for reasons of political prudence involving the Cold War.49 King carried on Du Bois's insights that the treatment of African Americans was related to America's international policies, especially after he was awarded the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize. His protests of the Vietnam War and beyond that his call for land reform (in his 1967 Riverside Church speech), against US policy in Latin America, resulted in harsh assessments and dissention within the civil rights movement he had come to symbolize. He was also disinvited from the Johnson White House.50 We have already noted, in chapter 5, West's emphasis on US foreign policy, as part of the black prophetic tradition, as well as his harsh remarks about President Obama. West is also not welcome in Obama’s White House.51 These projects of making African American concerns more broad by extending the area of complaint and protest to nonblack American poor people and non-American people of color have not met with great success. They have neither strengthened the movements of their time, nor reduced or ended poverty (and American foreign policy has been impervious to their demands). Bitter reactions from the African American community to the US presidency reverberate when black liberatory spokespeople voice strong opinions on foreign policy. It is unimaginable at this time that such issues can be related to African American activism in official or public understandings, but it is also unimaginable that the issues are not related in reality. This is a situation of stasis. However, there is now another dimension to global aspects of US social justice activism media. The pleas in a number of local demonstrations and protests about police homicide' of unarmed African Americans, such as “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,’\* "I Can’t Breathe,” "Black Lives Matter" and “No Justice, No Peace," have been highly publicized by the mainstream media, as have successive police homicides after the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012,52 The New York Times brought all of this to a head on April 6, 2015, by posting a video of Walter Scott being shot in the back while fleeing a police officer in South Carolina. With prose befitting the cool temperature of The New Yorker magazine, Philip Gourivitch posted the following about that video: There it was, front and center, on the home page of my local paper, the Times, and on the BBC, and the Guardian, and the Wall Street Journal, and thousands of other news sites, as well as hundreds of thousands of Facebook pages and Twitter feeds: a freeze-frame showing a white policeman in the process of shooting a black man to death, with a play button you could click to watch the whole killing from start to finish,54 Gourevitch went on to discuss the ethics of journalistic displays of people getting killed and raised a question of respect for death on the part of viewers. What Gourevitch neglected to point out was the power of this video to provide conclusive evidence of contemporary injustice concerning the contemporary issue of police officer killings of unarmed black men, for which there have customarily been acquittals or failures to indict. The usual justification that an officer has acted out of fear for his own life is not supported by this video. What Gourevitch does succeed in pointing out is the global publicity that now attends such incidents. This international dimension of US race relations is different from the connection between US domestic and foreign policy on a theoretical level because it has the potential to spark vast external moral pressure on American government entities, perhaps similar to the Cold War pressures that were influential in Brown v. Board of Education and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as discussed in chapter 4. Issues of poverty, including global poverty, expand theoretical concerns about the carceral and other existential vulnerabilities of poor African Americans, to include people of other races, notably whites domestically and other peoples of color abroad. By the same token US foreign policy raises issues of global white nonwhite racial divides Still in terms of activism, these have largely remained theoretical issues that support broader understanding. They may describe issues for move ments lost, past, or yet to be developed, but in terms of contemporary social justice activism, concrete change is a matter of US domestic issues concerning race relations and the practical tradition of the undra-matic, obscure aspects of the Long Revolution is very important. The vagueness of Williams s idea of the Long Revolution promises an ordinary, day-to-day methodology for addressing racial injustice. Ordinariness is required given the time span of the Long Revolution that according to Williams began in 1789. The ability to sustain continual low key and undramatic liberatory efforts may require the kind of faith found in activists within the black prophetic tradition, who were not as charismatic as Martin Luther King Jr., but attended to specific issues over decades. For instance, West contrasts the contributions of Ella Baker to those of King, describing her as “an unassuming person who helps the suppressed to help themselves.” Baker’s organizing work included her service as secretary of the NAACP, executive director of the Southern Christian Leadership Council, and cofounder of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee. Baker knew both Du Bois and King and was skilled at grassroots organizing, but she did not write essays or books or produce mesmerizing speeches. She talked about humility and service alongside everyday people and insisted that members of a movement motivate themselves.55 “Think Globally, Act Locally” In light of the insight that amounts to “Think globally, act locally,” borrowed from environmentalist planning discourse,56 let’s return now to Wacquant’s general model of the contemporary carceral system as a form of social control that extends beyond punishment for crimes. Wacquant’s analysis suggests that at least three different social situations would be more accessible to activist-sparked change than the overall global capitalist system: race-based residential segregation; impoverishment of the educational system as it serves the poor; assumptions about the traditional family that have had a slanderous effect on black family images. Residential segregation enables the architectural and geographic formation of ghettos as areas targeted for intrusive law enforcement surveillance, because poor and powerless blaeks are physically clustered in one place.57 Also, insofar as schools are financed by taxes based on property values, residential segregation results in impoverished resources for K-12 education. Both segregated substandard housing and inadequate schools are issues that can be addressed through local activism and support for the development of employable skills and jobs. While the "feminization of poverty" has been well-documented, ad ditional attention could be paid to the assumption that women the primary caretakers for children, which explains why welfare and workfare programs have been concentrated on them, with the state replacing the function of a male provider in a nuclear family. However, ever since reactions to the 1965 Moynihan Report, and earlier in the work of E. Franklin Frazier, it has been known that many African Americans do not grow up in, or themselves form, traditional nuclear families with stay-at-home mothers and male breadwinner fathers. Positing poverty as the cause of this unconventional family structure had been the standing practice in sociology until Patrick Moynihan, writing for the US Department of Labor, claimed that the cause of black single mothers, illegitimacy, and extended family structures, was cultural pathology with roots in social arrangements that had been necessary under slavery and Jim Crow.59 Despite the obsessive morbid interest in Moynihan's characterization of family organization among the black poor, it has been outpaced by more broad historical changes. Not only have women of color, especially African American women, always worked outside of their homes, but most white women and women in other racial and ethnic groups, on all socioeconomic levels, now work outside of their homes. For poor women, their employment hinges both on skills and available and accessible jobs. The surrogate traditional-family aspects of welfare and workfare can therefore be viewed as so outdated as not to be worth theoretical consideration. This means that the need for welfare and workfare programs reduces to a need for more jobs for poor black women—and a need for transportation to and from those jobs, as well as affordable childcare.60 As of April 2015, adult African American women had the highest rate of unemployment at 9.2 percent, compared to 6.5 for Latinas and 4.2 for white women, (The website of the National Womens Law Center has portals for instructions on how those concerned about this issue can email their congressmen and senators.) Finally, a contemporary example of spoken and active discourse about an immediate problem has been provided by activists in Ferguson, Missouri, who met with President Obama in December 2014 to discuss their attempts to influences changes in local police practices. Said Ashley Yates, cofounder of the group Millennial Activists United, "We’re definitely going to keep doing the work on the ground, but meeting with the president, for me—well, I’ll say for everybody—is just an affirmation that this movement is working.”63 In February 2015, Ferguson activist groups called for 250 students to join them during spring break to provide community service such as clearing wreckage from earlier demonstrations and helping plant gardens. Said Patricia Barnes, a Democratic committeewoman for Ferguson, “The protests have got us here. The next step is to target the ballot box, to get people elected and to change policy. Students should take that back to their college campuses and build an infrastructure. . . . There is plenty to do.”64 Yes, there is plenty to do, but what needs to be done are fairly straightforward, day-to-day, community-based actions. Global systems are overreaching causal factors of local vulnerabilities, but there is no reason to believe that their local effects cannot be addressed on their local levels. LIBERTY, FREEDOM, AND INJUSTICE From a more abstract philosophical perspective, the foregoing discussion of revisionist history and active discourse, proceeding as they have from the concrete contemporary issue of racial injustice in the US criminal justice system, is a matter of liberty and freedom. Imprisonment is, after all, the classic, concrete example of not having liberty. And if we follow John Locke in saying that it is the whole person, and not the will, that can be free,65 then a person in prison is not free. But philosophically, being in prison or not does not capture the abstract nature of liberty and freedom as political ideas and ideals. by influential political philosophers, for instance Isiah Berlin in his canonical 1958 lecture, "Two Concepts of Liberty."66 Berlin distinguished between negative liberty, or what others including government officials are not permitted to do to a person, and positive liberty, an area of personal autonomy allowing for individual choice and development. He was wary of the abuses by paternalism or quietism to which the idea of positive liberty could be subject. On the one hand, paternalistic or despotic leaders could take it upon themselves to determine what was The terms “liberty” and "freedom” have been used interchangeably good for others (for the good of a harmonious social whole, as well the individual freedom of rational beings)\* And, on the other hand, stoic quietists might seek to shrink individual choice to what was not prohib ited bv law or punishable by government force: For this doctrine, as it applies to individuals, it is no very great distance to the conceptions of those who, like Kant, identify freedom not indeed with the elimination of desires, but with resistance to them and control over them ... a sublime but, it seems to me, unmistakable, form of the doctrine of sour grapes. Insofar as Berlin championed the idea of negative liberty, in the tradition of J. S. Mill, three important qualifications tempered his libertarianism in ways that make it still relevant for active oppositional discourse. First, following Mill in equating incursions on core or essential negative liberty with coercion or slavery, Berlin acknowledged that freedom is only of value to those who can make use of it: “It is only because I believe that my inability to get a given thing is due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not, prevented from having enough money with which to pay for it, that I think myself a victim of coercion or slaverv. 68 Second, Berlin understood that people who are not free may take action against those who are limiting their freedom(s): "Those who are wedded to the ‘negative’ concept of freedom may perhaps be forgiven if they think that self-abnegation is not the only method of overcoming obstacles; that it is also possible to do so by removing them ... in the case of human resistance, by force or persuasion.” Third, Berlin recognized the importance of status or recognition, which in some cases might outweigh the value of negative liberty, to members of groups with a history of oppressive rule by others. However, in rethinking Berlin (as well as Locke), a focus on active discourse against injustice may require a distinction between liberty and freedom. What that distinction amounts to is that freedom can be used to expand the possibilities for resistance against unjust curtailments of liberty. The term "liberty" (or negative liberty in Berlin's sense) can be used to refer to lack of external constraint and "freedom" to refer to decisions, choices, and interests of a subject, apart from their expression. For example, racially biased stops and frisks infringe on the US constitutional liberty of black subjects to be free from arbitrary searches and seizures, according to the Fourth Amendment. Poverty, viewed as a cross-racial or multiracial condition, may also be a limitation on freedom. Liberty is an external political matter, usually pertaining to rights under positive law and compliance or noncompliance with such rights. Freedom is a contested, psychic issue. If constraints on liberty are persistent and systematic, they may limit a people’s freedom, because individual decisions, choices, and interests are influenced and inspired by what individuals are practically able to do—that is, by their liberties. We can say that a people with a history of poverty accompanied by restrictions in economic liberty will not be as economically advantaged as a people whose history did not contain such restrictions because the accumulation of wealth is passed on from generation to generation. The disparity in family wealth between American blacks and whites is a strong example of this kind of ongoing constraint.70 However, when economic disadvantage is combined with racist attitudes and undereducation, the distinction between liberty and freedom may be eroded. Children growing up in constrained circumstances may not develop freedom in the psychic sense, in addition to restrictions on their liberty. An important part of the choices enabled by psychic freedom requires imagination, as well as self-esteem and knowledge of the broader world beyond one’s immediate family and neighborhood. Jean-Paul Sartre emphasized that the ability to realistically project oneself into a future set of circumstances that are different from undesirable present ones requires some knowledge of those future circumstances to cultivate a motivational dissatisfaction with present conditions. Progressive activists have shown how Sartre’s hypothesis can become a politicizing method: Organizers during early stages of Second Wave feminism conducted “consciousness raising” exercises to make women aware of their oppression;71 practical leaders of ethnic and racial liberatory movements from Ella Baker to Paolo Friere have proceeded with education of members of oppressed groups,72 exactly to activate their freedom, so that they can choose greater liberty as a goal. The Distribution of Liberty To speak of rights violations is to speak of unjust curtailments of liberty. It is presumed here that liberty consists of all the things that people are able to do, that they are in some sense entitled to do, as human beings and which government is not supposed to obstruct them from doing. The reduction of procedural justice to distributive justice in chapter 4 is now useful for considering liberty and freedom as relevant to opposi tional active discourse. The view of liberty and freedom, but especially liberty, as a matter of procedural justice is more nebulous than a view of liberty as a good that is distributed. Procedures tend to be imagined as methods that need only be justified by those who administer them and their superiors. But distributions give goods out and they have end recipients. If procedures are not always followed in the same way for blacks and whites, this can be defended by saying that something unusual happened in a particular case or that there was an innocent error. It may be claimed as an excuse that the client/citizen/resident/plaintiff/ defendant did not correctly perform her role in the procedure, interfered with the procedure delivered by officials, or failed to act in a way that expressed reasonable understanding of the procedure, for example, there was a “language barrier.” Procedures can be legally designed in ways that have different effects on members of different groups. Police racial profiling as part of a general procedure for maintaining law and order, photo ID requirements for voter registration, and English instructions to residents who do not speak English are all examples of legal procedures that have been justified without mention of race or ethnicity, but have different effects on members of different populations. However, if justice is viewed as a matter of distribution, the relevant test that it has been carried out, given all other things equal, is whether the social good that the procedure is supposed to be a fair or neutral means for distributing, does get fairly and neutrally distributed. The view of just procedures as distributed goods, bypasses color-blind policies that do not have race-neutral effects. When the distribution of negative liberty or procedural justice is unfair, the result is distributional injustice. Judith Shklar, known mainly for her claim that cruelty should be a primary or foundational concern of secular, liberal political philosophy,73 addresses injustice as a subject in its own right. Although Shklar does not refer to Berlin, her focus on the distinction between an external judgment that another who is disadvantaged is suffering from misfortune and the sufferer's perception that she has been treated unjustly does echo Berlin’s qualification that there may be minimal material and cultural requirements for a person’s nega-tive liberty to be of value to her. A poor, uneducated person, who does not understand the broader institutional causes of her poverty, may not be able to use the negative liberty legally afforded her to do anything she chooses with her life. She might not have the freedom to take advantage of her liberty. It may not occur to her to resist micro-oppres-sions or try to move into a better neighborhood because she has not been educated in ways that stimulate imagination. Externally, she may be viewed as having made poor choices or lacking the virtue of a work ethic, but subjectively she may experience her situation as unjust. And if her freedom has been impaired by restrictions on her liberty, her situa-tion is objectively unjust. In The Faces of Injustice, Shklar expresses an overall dissatisfaction with philosophical theories of justice, which is parallel to the project undertaken in this book. However, although she begins by defining injustice as “an act that goes against some known legal or ethical rule,”74 her approach to defining injustice in this short text continually wrestles with the distinction between injustice and misfortune. On the way, Shklar is very mindful of the overwhelming odds against victims of injustice in societies considered just: they are not heard; their resignation is taken for granted; they do not have remedies for redress or timely access to rectification in the form of punishment against those who have been unjust to them; they lack the means to change social practices that cause their injustice. Shklar is particularly sensitive to the plight of those who suffer injustice in concrete ways on account of their “ascriptive” identities, such as women until very recently and US racial minorities more or less permanently.75 Nevertheless, and this is where Shklar’s otherwise pessimistic combination of history and political philosophy makes an invigorating contribution to the subject of activist political discourse, she posits the recognition of injustice as both an eons-long and fundamental human moral intuition and a general civic right and obligation in democratic societies. Shklar writes: A black American may well expect that she will not get a fair hearing from certain public agencies, but as a citizen she knows this is not what is expected of our public servants, and she can certainly feel and communicate her sense of injustice when her claims are ignored. There is, however, a bond between these two kinds of expectation, Unpredicted, sudden injustices are resented far more intensely than those one has learned to endure as a member of a group. They tear away the emotional protection created by resignation and allow dis-tress to burst from its confines. Furthermore, in a way that just happens to capture the spirit of this chapter and complete the book, Shklar provides this statement of legitimation for political activism: Democratic principles oblige us to treat each expression of a sense of injustice not just fairly according to the actual rules but also with a view to better and potentially more equal ones. To be sure, democracy does not fulfill its immanent promises quickly, but at least it does not silence the voice of protest, which it knows to be the herald of change.77 Shklar here proclaims the democratic legitimacy of expression of a sense of injustice. When we add that idea to the known existence of injustice as part of a Bentleyan process of government, active political discourse in the form of real life action can be recognized as part of the whole process of government. There is sound reason to undertake it and support its undertaking with confidence, both for change now and in view of the Long Revolution.

#### Music as praxis fails.

Michael Hanson 8, Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California, San Diego, “Suppose James Brown Read Fanon: The Black Arts Movement, Cultural Nationalism and the Failure of Popular Musical Praxis,” Popular Music, Vol. 27, No. 3, October 2008, accessed via JSTOR

By the mid-1960s the political impulse within black communities began to cohere in and animate cultural production and criticism, forcing attention onto the political qualities of black expressive culture.10 The Black Arts Movement developed as a somewhat diverse, yet generally coherent project that explicitly attempted to link cultural expression to black political practice in the form of a unique Black Aesthetic. The more general designation, cultural nationalism, distinguishes a position within black self-determination discourses that valorises black culture -at the extreme, employing the Hegelian dialectics of recognition and inversion that devalue European culture and history while mythologising Africa as the primordial site of positive transfiguration and social uplift in the recuperative gestures of self-making.11

Principal BAM critic Larry Neal referred to the Black Aesthetic as 'the aesthetic and spiritual sister of the Black Power concept is concerned with the relationship between art and politics; the other with the art of polities' (Neal 1971, p. 257). By explicitly yoking politics to cultural production, the Black Aesthetic envisioned a cultural praxis that, as key BAM figure Leroi Jones/ Amiri Baraka claimed would 'fight for black people's liberation with as much inten- sity as Malcolm X our "Fire Prophet" and the rest of the enraged masses' (Neal 1989, p. x).12 By 1963, as emblemised in the raw racial emotion of his play Dutchman and the landmark black musicological intervention, Blues People, Jones/Baraka had begun repudiating his earlier involvement with downtown modernist literary aesthetics, concentrating instead more intensely on black cultural practices, specifically black music.

The short-lived Black Artists Repertory Theatre and School, or BART/S, in Harlem was, in vital ways, the archetypal black arts intervention. On 22 February 1965, the day after Malcolm X was assassinated, Baraka held a press conference in which he announced the formation of a new project devoted to the politico-aesthetic project of black liberation. BART/S involved a number of prominent cultural workers - Harold Cruse, Sun Ra, Albert Ayler, Archie Shepp, Sonia Sanchez, Ed Bullins, Askia Muhammad Toure and Larry Neal - who were principal actors in later nationalist-oriented projects. Perhaps most symptomatic of the fractious and conten- tious interest positions that undermine social movements from within, the political promise of BART/S singular mission itself narrowed, constricted and then over-ran and expelled those voices that did not adhere to the dominant line of a few charismatic and overly-ambitious egos (Woodward 1999, pp. 67-8). By fall 1965, BART/S had dissipated under the weight of its own in-fighting and found Baraka retreating from Harlem in defeat, refocusing organisational and creative energies in hometown Newark.

A particularly reductive gloss tends to emplot the entirety of this complex cultural and political moment. Retrospectively, the Black Arts Movement is typically portrayed as an unremitting, militant, masculinist arbiter of aesthetic practice and black authenticity, policing the expressive world for non-revolutionary art while yoking political meaning to every gesture, thought and expression. Many of these dismissive claims of the Black Aesthetic impulse do indeed have powerful merits - that the social realism of BAM trades the political for art and art for the political thus producing weakened attempts at both; that 'good' art is not equivalent to black skin; that BAM and nationalism's masculinist rhetoric creates internal cleavages and exclu- sions within the black collective (Harper 1996); that its racial chauvinism suffers from an antipathy toward white or European oppositionality (Taylor 1998).

However, the constellation of intellectuals, cultural producers, expressive media, tendencies, locales, and practices that constituted the Black Aesthetic was often diverse, leading to contradictory and competing political claims on collective identity, political formation, tactic and most significantly political praxis. In 1971, literary critic Addison Gayle, Jr. edited The Black Aesthetic, the principal statement and most coherent document of black aesthetic thought. Because there were diverse problematics addressed in BAM - the nature of black criticism, the development of a black critical framework, the role of the black artist in political struggle, the relative power of various media, particularly black music, and so on - the constituent posi- tions represented in The Black Aesthetic reveal more internal contradictions and ambivalence than critical analyses tend to acknowledge.13

One prominent black aesthetic position foregrounded black community and the political obligation that cultural producers had to make relevant and consumable aesthetic expressions that spoke to black experience. Critic Larry Neal, in his founda- tional statement on the Black Aesthetic, is exemplary here:

The Black Arts Movement is radically opposed to any concept of the artist that alienates him [sic] from his community. Black Art is the aesthetic and spiritual sister of the Black Power concept. As such, it envisions an art that speaks directly to the needs and aspirations of Black America, (in Gayle 1971, p. 257)

In this case, the idealistic, explicit encoding of aesthetics with ethics and revolutionary nationalist concerns was not intended to be a 'protest' art as such, which implied an appeal to white morality, but rather a vehicle to communicate directly with the black masses (ibid., p. 258). Neal would be a primary proponent of function - the efficacy of black expression to shape, organise, and transmit political value - over craft - the modernist, Western tradition emphasising the autonomy and potentially apolitical nature of aesthetic expression (Baker, 1988). Here, the literary craft of Ralph Ellison and Albert Murray, in particular, was emblemised as the discursive foe to revolution- ary aesthetic praxis.14

The Black Aesthetic also contested the ways racial domination historically conditions the aesthetic criteria by which black art is judged. The black critic here functions to refigure the critical categories that have historically denigrated, devalued or simply excluded the contributions of Afrodiasporic expression. Critic Hoyt Fuller writes of the need to establish new critical frameworks (and critics) that 'will be able to articulate and expound the new aesthetic and eventually set in motion the long overdue assault against the restrictive assumptions of the white critics' (in Gayle 1971, p. 9). This call for a new aesthetic framework in its most moderate elaboration can be read as nothing more than a demand for expanded and inclusive critical referents.

Yet, at the ideological and racially exclusive extreme, cultural nationalist and US leader, Ron Malauna Karenga's injunction demanded that,

what is needed is an aesthetic, a black aesthetic, that is a criteria for judging the validity and/or beauty of a work of art ... all art must reflect and support the Black revolution, and any art that does not discuss and contribute to the revolution is invalid. . . . Black art must expose the enemy, praise the people and support the revolution. (Karenga 1971, pp. 31-2)

Dispersed among these positions were a host of other stances, concerns and strategies. The diversity of positions making up The Black Aesthetic and the varied expressions of cultural nationalist activism in local communities mirrors the broader labours of a black political project that was always embattled and contested, both from within and without.

Like Nigritude15 before it, the invocation of a narrow affirmational blackness in part served as a political trope, an explicit technique of foregrounding a racial dialectic between white and black, coloniser and colonised. The structuring principle of Nigritude relied on the positive resignification of blackness as a visibly marked and audibly charged point of political mobilisation. This symbolic re-ordering often relied on overwrought, at times mythical revisions of history. The political terms of Nigritude, and similarly the Black Aesthetic, were themselves the site of contestation and pivoted upon the constituents of blackness - from an essentialist and grandiose mythopoetic celebration of an almost biologistic racial unity to a diasporal cultural identity linked by the historical forces of collective subjugation.

Racial dualism also premised black nationalist rhetoric, a strategic essentialising, following Gayatri Spivak, in the name of political efficacy.16 To some degree this was efficacious, the nascent sense of self-pride and political possibility, for instance, drew upon this binary logic. However, the shoring up of the boundaries of black collective identity in the name of political mobilisation, the evocation of a singular black aesthetic or outlook, as a unifying cord of ingroup formation continually risked falling into an uncompromising, chauvinistic rhetorical straightjacket. The consolidating power derived from the dualistic Black Aesthetic unity was also its major weakness - the underside to the liberatory performance of black self-definition is the formation of new abject targets that fall outside the narrow template set by nationalist doctrine. Black nationalist positions can also reveal, as Nathan Grant (1998, p. 36) points out, 'the internecine quality of life in the Black community - the community's newly found ability to feed upon itself and middle-class Blacks all become the usual fare for a new generation of Bigger Thomases'. Moreover, as Clyde Taylor argues, the wholesale invocation of blackness, as positive sign, simply reflects a collective insecurity that prompts reactive outbursts of racial cheerleading (Taylor 1998 ).17 Phillip Brian Harper adds that the oppositional logic of the Black Arts Movement inadvertently produces divisions within the black community that foreclose black collective action (Harper 1996, p.48).

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### Impact---2NC

#### It causes terrorism, civil wars, and diversion that go global---nothing checks

Dr. Qian Liu 18, PhD in Economics from Uppsala University, Former Visiting Researcher at the University of California, Berkeley, Managing Director for Greater China at The Economist Group, Guest Lecturer at New York University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Fudan University, “The Next Economic Crisis Could Cause A Global Conflict. Here's Why”, World Economic Forum, 11/13/2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict.

The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates.

But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies.

Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment.

The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008.

In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929.

As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy.

If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterized also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war.

For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun.

To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict.

According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels.

This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis.

Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen.

Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington , considering such a scenario could help us avoid it, because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

### Link---2NC

#### Not paying student loan debt nukes the economy---independently turns case.

Abigail Johnson Hess 21, Multimedia Reporter for CNBC, “3 ways student debt impacts the economy,” CNBC, 07-02-2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/02/3-ways-student-debt-impacts-the-economy.html

During the height of the pandemic, workers with college degrees were spared some of the harshest consequences. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that workers with a bachelor’s degree are less likely to be unemployed and earn 67% more than those with just a high school degree. Plus, college graduates live longer than those without a college degree.

While student loans can be crucial in helping Americans access these benefits, economists say that student debt is holding the economy back.

Approximately 45 million Americans collectively owe $1.7 trillion in student debt. And even though federal student loan payments have been paused since March 27, 2020, the student loan crisis is still looming. The moratorium is set to expire Oct. 1, 2021 and politicians and experts warn that millions of borrowers may be thrown into “extraordinary financial hardship” when payments resume.

CNBC Make It spoke with Nela Richardson, chief economist of human resource management firm ADP, about three of the biggest ways student debt impacts the economy.

1. Generational inequality

Richardson stresses that student debt is a concern because of the way it disproportionately impacts young people today more than in previous generations.

Decades of cuts to education funding means that students pay much higher college costs than previous generations did. Over the past 10 years, college costs increased by more than 16% and student debt totals increased by 99%. Today, not only do roughly 70% of college students take out loans to pay for their education, but they take out larger volumes.

Plus, recent college graduates have entered the workforce during one of the most hostile labor markets in history for young workers. According to an analysis of BLS data by Pew Research Center, 2020 college graduates saw a bigger decrease in labor force participation than those who graduated during the Great Recession.

“Student debt falls heavily on the shoulders of young people. They have the lowest incomes and are most likely to have recently finished college,” says Richardson. “We know from our data that young people were disproportionately impacted by the pandemic. They were more likely to report a job loss, a reduction in job responsibilities or a pay cut. When you add that to student debt, that creates quite a sizable hurdle.”

The result is growing generational inequality that will have significant long-term consequences, she warns: “It’s about macro growth. We should care [about student debt] because it does affect the future of GDP growth when there’s a lack of investment among young people.”

Federal Reserve data indicates that millennials control just 5% of U.S. wealth while baby boomers control over 52%. In 1989, when baby boomers were around the same age as millennials are today, they controlled 21% of the country’s wealth.

2. GDP

Student debt impacts borrowers over time by raising debt burdens, lowering credit scores and ultimately, limiting the purchasing power of those with student debt. Because young people are disproportionately burdened by student debt, they will be less able to participate in — and help grow — the economy in the long run.

“What you want is widespread opportunity for investment over time. That’s what’s good for the economy. That’s what’s good for Wall Street,” says Richardson. “If you don’t have that, then you’re looking at slower growth from the prime-aged working population — and that’s problematic.”

The Federal Reserve estimates that student debt shaves roughly 0.05% off GDP per year. While the current impact may appear relatively small, as borrowers struggle to buy homes, save for retirement and invest in the stock market, the impact may become more significant.

“All those assets that the boomers have been accumulating to feed the economy, who’s going to buy those assets? Who’s going to take over to make sure that the stock and asset markets keep going up?” asks Richardson. “Maybe boomers can leave those through inheritance to their children, but that just concentrates wealth, which gets back to the issue of inequality.”

3. Delinquency

Finally, there is the concern that many borrowers are expected to default on their student loans.

Currently, about $158.5 billion worth of federally managed student loans are considered in default — and this total may increase once the pause on federal student loan payments expires. Brookings estimates that by 2023, nearly 40% of borrowers are expected to default on their student loans.

“If you have delinquencies, that lowers credit scores, and that’s problematic in terms of doing anything in the economy from getting a credit card to getting a mortgage,” says Richardson, citing ADP data that suggests student loans account for 35% of severely derogatory loan balances, more than three times the delinquency rate of mortgages.

Richardson fears that because of student loan difficulties, borrowers will be held back from generating wealth through means such as buying a home or starting a business. “When you think about how the middle class builds wealth over time, there’s two ways in the U.S.: homeownership and entrepreneurship,” she says.

While consumer spending appears to be stable for now, Richardson stresses that the student debt crisis should be addressed in order to maintain economic growth.

“If you’re very focused on the here and now and the present economic recovery, you can shrug off consumer debt,” she says. “But if you care about the future, and you think about what leads to feature growth and investment, then student debt is one thing that can block that.”

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### Overview---1NR

#### Mitigation is necessary to stem rising climate authoritarianism and white nationalist backlash.

Meyer 16 – Robinson Meyer, Associate Editor of the Atlantic, Life-Long Environmental and Technology Journalist and Activist, “Donald Trump Is the First Demagogue of the Anthropocene,” The Atlantic, 10-19, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/trump-the-first-demagogue-of-the-anthropocene/504134/

Climate change could push Western politics toward demagoguery and authoritarianism in two ways, then. First, it could devastate agricultural yields and raise food prices; destroy coastal real estate and wash away family wealth; [transform old commodities into luxury goods](https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/avocado-shortage-price-hike/504383/). Second, it could create a wave of migration—likely from conflict, but possibly from environmental ruination—that stresses international reception systems and risks fomenting regional resource disputes.

In effect, it could erode people’s sense of security, pushing them toward authoritarianism.

If this model of authoritarian response seems simplistic, that’s because it is. Economic strife and mass migration have produced far-right authoritarianism in the past, so I assume they could in the future. Empirically speaking, [financial crises especially seem to cause a flight to the extremes](http://voxeu.org/article/political-aftermath-financial-crises-going-extremes). But they do not guarantee anything, and I’ve focused on the questions of contributors—mass migration and conflict—because they are easier to predict than politics.

Yet in doing so I’ve committed the trend-tracker’s fallacy. Like the CEO in the 1950s who predicted that America would see flying cars and three-day workweeks by the year 1999, I’ve assumed that every ongoing trend line can be extrapolated out indefinitely. They can’t. The actual future will be far stranger.

Yet history will still be constrained by demography, ideology, and atmospheric chemistry. “There are certainly plenty of viable scenarios where people could move into places and you get an ethnonationalist backlash. We’re seeing it!” Carr said at one point. “So clearly it could happen again. And I absolutely am convinced that, in the long run, the effects of climate change will be problematic and destabilizing for many of us in many places.”

Trump is, in essence, a double case—a preview of what’s to come and a way to practice dealing with it. He represents a test [that the leaders of a major American political party](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/the-hollow-men/492320/) are failing, and that the electorate may only narrowly pass. He is showing us how ill-prepared the United States is for post-climate demagoguery, and he gives us an opportunity to improve our societal immune response.

How might we do that? His rise also suggests a number of defense mechanisms. Obviously, the first is that climate change must be mitigated with all deliberate speed. But he also suggests certain cultural mechanisms. Some Americans may favor [more restrictive immigration policies](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/what-was-so-shocking-about-trumps-immigration-speech/498386/), but—in order to withstand against future waves of mass migration (and humanely deal with the victims of climate change)—racist fears [must be unhooked from immigration restrictionism](http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-immigration-speech-shocking-2016-9). In other words, as a matter of survival against future authoritarians, white supremacy must be rejected and defeated.

And there is a third method of fighting back against Trump and his ilk. Carr doesn’t think it makes sense to improve the response in receiving countries; I am less convinced. After all, he also told me that reception to migrants in the U.S. depends greatly on regional cultures. Central Massachusetts, where he lives now, [welcomed about 10,000 Ghanian refugees in the 1970s](https://www.modernghana.com/news/21065/1/10000-ghanaians-call-central-mass-home.html), and it never entered a period of mass white-nationalist revulsion. The United States still [welcomes and integrates immigrants](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/assimilation-nation/309518/) faster than European countries.

Those regional cultures can still be improved and strengthened. In April, a poll conducted by The Atlantic and the Public Religion Research Institute found that the voters most likely to vote for Donald Trump [were civically disengaged](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/voting-alone/477270/)—they did not go to church, or volunteer at school or Girl Scouts, or join a book club. These Americans were also more likely to be financially insecure and less likely to be well educated.

When journalists write about [how you can avert the worst of climate change](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/03/upshot/what-you-can-do-about-climate-change.html), they focus primarily on technological means. The environmentally anxious are encouraged to give up industrial beef, to buy carbon credits, to install rooftop solar panels. An entrepreneurial neighborhood might be told to build [community solar](http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49930.pdf). A well-off consumer might be asked to splurge on an electric car.

The only social or political act that most of these explainers will propose is this: You should vote for candidates who understand climate science and who will act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. (In the United States, and in no other developed country, that only describes the candidates of one major political party.)

It makes sense to put voting  in that list because, really, all those technological actions resemble voting—they are all essentially just types of harm reduction. At worst, skipping beef or buying carbon credits is an ethically valuable but economically worthless gesture; at best, it modestly helps avoid a much worse outcome.

But Trump’s success in the primary among the civically disintegrated suggests another way forward. Improving the United States’s immune response to authoritarian leadership—a response that could be repeatedly tested in the century to come—can follow from weaving its civic fabric ever tighter. I don’t know what this will look like, exactly, for every person. But here are some places to start: Volunteer. Run for local or state office. Give to charity (whether due to religion or effective altruism). Organize at work. Join a church or a community choir or the local library staff. Make your hometown a better place for refugees to settle. Raise a child well.

These may seem inconsequential, tasks unrelated to the final goal of restricting how much carbon dioxide enters the environment. And, admittedly, they are. But climate realists have always split their work between mitigation—that is, trying to keep the climate from getting worse—and adaptation—trying to protect what we already have. As more warming gets baked into the biosphere, as seas rise and livelihoods fall, these prosaic steps will become vital forms of adaptation.

Climate mitigation is a worthy goal in itself. It is all the more important when understood as one more type of long-term anti-fascism.

### AT: Do Both

#### The call for a move ‘beyond politics’ AND to reorient towards relationality is weaponized to dismiss the need for a climate politics.

Kai Heron & Jodi Dean 20, Editor, ROAR Magazine; Professor, Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, "Revolution or Ruin," E-Flux Journal, Issue #110, June 2020, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/.

Although the climate change debate has moved beyond the division between deniers and believers, some progressives remain attached to denial. Instead of fighting on the new terrain produced by widespread acknowledgement of the fact of climate change, they displace denial into their own arguments, shielding themselves from the overwhelming burden of action. While no one seriously denies climate change anymore, progressives have found new—and often quite creative—ways to deny climate change’s true political consequences, guaranteeing that nothing essential has to change.

Progressive Denial

Some progressives have decided that ruin is inevitable. We just need to accept it. These progressives continue to present the most pressing problem now as climate catastrophe denialism. The task at hand, we are told, is psychological. For example, Jem Bendell’s 2018 “Deep Adaptation Agenda” takes the inevitability of societal collapse to be a matter not of physical infrastructure and energy sources but of human values and psychology. Climate change is like getting cancer: it forces a massive reevaluation of what is important in life. The failure to accept the climate catastrophe masks a deeper failure to develop a better relation to the earth.

Five years before Bendell published his deep adaptation agenda, Roy Scranton had already presented the task at hand as learning how to die. In a Stoicism refitted for the Anthropocene, Scranton argued that we have to accept that there is nothing we can do to save ourselves. This acceptance will enable us to detach ourselves from false hopes and fruitless plans. It will let us free ourselves from fear.

Scranton and Bendell write in terms of a civilizational us, a “we” of shared values, metaphysics, and investment in the privileges of the carbon economy. There’s no class struggle, no inequality of responsibility for or capacity to respond to the fires, droughts, floods, and storms of a rapidly changing planet. Politics disappears, replaced by the individual’s psychological capacity to acknowledge the worst and respond ethically, that is, reflectively.

Less metaphysical, although equally resigned to planetary ruin, is Jonathan Franzen. For Franzen, any hope of avoiding civilizational catastrophe is misguided, even harmful, leading to misplaced efforts and broken dreams. To think that we might build new transportation and energy systems, much less replace capitalist competition with communist planning, is a pipe dream—futile and delusional. We need accumulated capital in order to weather the fires, hurricanes, droughts and other emergencies as they increase in frequency and furor. The best we can do is buttress the status quo, “promoting respect for laws and their enforcement,” while also advocating for gun control and racial and gender equality. Our best course, in other words, is to follow the liberal line, not make a fuss, and be sure to remain on good terms with the police. If Bendell’s and Scranton’s embrace of climate catastrophe means that everything changes, Franzen’s means that nothing does. Because there is nothing we can do, there is little to be done, apart from what we would be doing anyway. The little to be done, for Franzen as well as Bendell and Scranton, is to combat climate catastrophe denialism, making sure that people comprehend just how catastrophic the situation really is.

Other progressives have rightly refused to join Bendell, Scranton, and Franzen in their embrace of eco-nihilism. David Wallace-Wells and Dipesh Chakrabarty, for instance, have argued that it is not too late to take action. Yet in their different ways these authors end up as proponents of a new kind of climate denialism. The eco-nihilist denial that there is anything to be done is replaced by a denial of the class character of global warming.

In his 2019 bestseller The Uninhabitable Earth, Wallace-Wells explains in great detail how the world’s inhabitants will suffer on a warming planet. “It’s worse, much worse, than you think,” the book begins. Wallace-Wells wants a falsely universalized “us” to feel the panic of comprehension as the severity of the crisis settles in. This panic, he thinks, will spur “us” into action. But the problem he addresses—awareness that action is needed—is no longer the issue. What is needed is a politics, and here Wallace-Wells comes up lacking. Now is not the time, he argues, to hold anyone in particular responsible for our climate calamity: “The burden of responsibility is too great to be shouldered by a few, however comforting it is to think that all that is needed is for a few villains to fall.”

For Wallace-Wells, ecological devastation has not been wrought upon the few by the many. Rather, “each of us imposes some suffering on our future selves every time we flip a switch, buy a plane ticket, or fail to vote.” Never mind that 1.2 billion people today have little to no access to electricity. Or that 80 percent of the world’s population has never flown. Or, most egregiously, that ExxonMobil executives already knew that their industry was destroying the planet in 1977 but chose to hide their findings and fund climate change–denying research because there was money to be made in killing future generations. To blame everyone equally in the face of such extreme inequality is to take the side of fossil capital. It denies rather than clarifies the obvious: the climate crisis is a space of class struggle.

Because Wallace-Wells does not see the classed character of climate breakdown he is on the wrong side again when it comes to suggestions about mitigating its effects. He admits that he doesn’t “have a firm perspective” on whether capitalism can solve the climate crisis and yet he expresses an “intuition”—a kind of liberal environmentalist spidey sense—that “we don’t need to abandon the prospect of economic growth to get a handle on climate change.”

Like Wallace-Wells, Chakrabarty denies the true political stakes of climate breakdown. He begins by asking the right question: “If the rich could simply buy their way out of this crisis and only the poor suffered, why would the rich nations do anything about global warming unless the poor of the world (including the poor of the rich nations) were powerful enough to force them?” But he comes to the wrong conclusion. Chakrabarty reasons that since “such power on the part of the poor is clearly not in evidence” and since the rich nations are not “known for their altruism,” “a better case for rich nations and classes to act on climate change … is couched in terms of their enlightened self-interest.” He thinks the rich simply need to be persuaded that it’s in their interest to get behind efforts to address climate change. His argument has more in common with bourgeois political economist Adam Smith than it does with the fight for social and climate justice. Like Smith’s “invisible hand,” it assumes that the self-interest of the capitalist class can be harnessed for the common good, that the “natural laws” of market competition have benevolent consequences.

Such thinking underestimates how much money there is to be made in a warming world. Mining companies buy land in Greenland with the knowledge that melting ice will reveal new mineral and oil reserves. Private security firms prepare to defend wealthy clients from civil unrest caused by droughts, floods, and famines. Dutch engineering companies sell flood-management expertise and plans for floating cities. Wealthy investors buy vast swathes of farmland in the Global South in hope of cashing in when droughts make arable land scarce. Many millions will die from the effects of global warming and capitalists are counting on it.

Capital’s self-expanding logic is indifferent to death. This is capitalism’s history and present. Investors and conservative opinion leaders prioritizing the capitalist economy over public health is one example. The refusal of Amazon to provide basic cleaning of its warehouses and personal protective equipment to its workers is another. The “enlightened self-interest” of the capitalist class is a fantasy that masks an underlying acceptance of exploitation, dispossession, and imperialism. Fundamental change is achieved through force, through class struggle, and through the agency of the oppressed.

Progressive intellectuals are not the only ones who deny that the climate crisis is political. Extinction Rebellion (XR), one of today’s most prominent environmental movements, argues that climate science speaks for itself and that politics gets in the way of action. The movement thus calls for a “move beyond politics.” The result is a denial of politics and a denial of responsibility.

XR describes itself as an “international apolitical network using non-violent direct action to persuade governments to act justly on the Climate and Ecological Emergency.” As its cofounder, Roger Hallam, explains in his pamphlet Common Sense for the 21st Century, the movement adopts an “apolitical” position in the hope of transcending bourgeois parliamentarism and social-movement factionalism. Hallam hopes to shift the climate crisis from a political issue to a moral one. He describes governmental inaction on climate change not as the conscious and strategic political decision to put profit before people and planet, but as a “moral failure.” Similarly, he presents the fight for social and ecological justice not as part of a mass working class movement but in terms of individual moral feeling.

To declare oneself “beyond politics” does not erase the reality of politics. In fact, one of the strange things about politics is that the more you try to go beyond it, the more caught up in it you are. This is a lesson that XR should have learned when critics exposed its blindness to the politics of race, disability, and class, but it didn’t. XR’s moralism defaults to a white petit-bourgeois liberalism that conforms perfectly to the dominant ideology of our times: politics is bad because it is divisive, because it asks us to choose sides, to name our comrades and our enemies. Most of all, politics is hard because it asks us to take and wield power, to be disciplined, focused, and clear-eyed about what we hope to achieve. It will always be easier—and no doubt more immediately gratifying—to cohere an apolitical movement around an ill-defined set of goals with no real enemies.

### AT: Util Bad

#### History proves the world has and will dramatically improve---don’t callously dismiss the potential for humanity.

Toby Ord 21, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University. Former advisor to the World Health Organization, the World Economic Forum, and the UK Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office, "Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity," How to Academy, transcribed by Otter.ai, 02/15/2021, 40:58-44:19. error edited by Jordan.

TO: Good question. So I don't ultimately know. And I in the book, I try not even I'm talking about the future a lot. I try not to be a Nostradamus right, to be making specific predictions about what's going to happen. And instead, what I tried to do is to sketch the size or the shape of our potential. And the way I think about that is, is kind of not the painting that will paint. But what is the canvas available to us? Or, and what you know, what is the palette of colors that we can find? And I look, yeah, towards the end of the book, I get into some, some detail about how long we could survive. And I show that, you know, typical species, if we can survive, as long as the typical species would be another million years, which is just a truly vast number of generations, where our own generation is just this is one small moment among all of this. But there's nothing ultimately stopping us lasting until the end of the earth in about a billion years, and potentially delaying that, through geoengineering, the geoengineering would actually not be that different to the geoengineering, we're talking about doing this century. And so if we can survive for 1 billion years, I'm pretty sure we'd be able to do it, if we wanted to, at that point, especially when the other outcome is that the earth is destroyed. And it's our only hope. And we could probably preserve the entire biosphere for billions of years more up to about 7 billion years. And then I think that we could live far beyond that as well. Because there are many other stars being born, which will, even if our star dies, that will last for much longer, and it will ultimately be trillions of years, while they're still stars burning in the Milky Way. And then also, our know, our scope, like they kind of physical scale of civilization could extend far beyond the earth, making the earth seem as parochial, as you know, as imagining how long my small town i'd grew up in, you know, is going to last or something like that, where, you know, that might really seem the wrong question here from this kind of global perspective. Similarly, you know, the Milky Way, has hundreds of millions of planets in it, there's that we could settle. And there are billions of galaxies that we could reach, as far as we best understand at the moment. So we think that the future could be very large and very long, and also the quality of life of individuals in it could continue to grow. We know that, you know, each human now lives about twice as long as they did 200 years ago. And our lives, you know, are longer. And they're also, you know, better in many ways. We have far less ill health, we have the, you know, literacy, it's now the norm instead of the exception. And we're also vastly wealthier. And far fewer of us live in poverty 200 years ago, and 95% of people lived below what we would now consider the absolute poverty line. And, and now, the vast majority of us are above it. So there's so many ways things have got better over time. And I think that could continue. And there are a whole lot of reasons to think that, that the upper limits of the quality of each of our lives over this vast future could just far exceed what we have so far. But that's all that's all at stake. So it's the fact that I'm so optimistic about this future, which makes me really want to strive to protect it and ensure that we get to fulfill this potential.

### AT: Blame

#### Disregarding the destruction of the planet is antithetical to the purpose of radical Black scholarship.

Fred Moten & Robin D.G. Kelley 17, Professor of Performance Studies at New York University; Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA, “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed (by dml) from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 31:49-55:57

MOTEN: Well, first of all, I just want to say how much I appreciate having a chance to be here with all of you tonight, and thank you, Rinaldo, and, uh, Alicia, and Afua, of course. Robin, as always, uh, an honor to be, have a chance to hang out with you, and uh, and to learn from you, and um, let me see. Um, well, I tend to think of Black studies not so much as an academic discipline or confluence of disciplines but as the atmosphere in which I grew up, and so, and I love that, that atmosphere. I love the way that it felt, and I love the way that it smelled, and I love the flavors, and I love the sounds, and I love the movements. Um, and so, it is, again, something that I think has a certain place, maybe, in the university, and what it meant, what it has meant for Black studies to take that place in the university has had both, has been both good and bad. I think it’s probably done much more for the university than it has for Black studies, and, and that’s something worth thinking about. And I don’t say that because I’m trying to advocate some withdrawal from the university of Black studies, but I’m thinking that, you know, that at this stage of the game in having done the work of attempting to actually bring, um, the university into some sense of its own, of what ought to be its own intellectual mission, Black studies has the right to look out for itself now, for a little bit, um, and I think it’s worth it to do that. And insofar as Black studies has earned a right to look out for itself, what that really means, I think, is that Black studies has earned the right to try again to take its fundamental responsibility, which is to be, uh, a place where we can look out for the Earth. Um, I think that Black studies has a fundamental and specific, though not necessarily exclusive mission, and that mission is to try to save the Earth, or at least to try to save, not, well, on the most fundamental level to save the Earth, and on a secondary level, to try to save the possibility of human existence on the Earth. Um, and I know that’s a big statement, and I don’t wanna take up all the time, but I’m happy to try to say more about what I think I mean by that later on, but, um, but I think maybe it’s important just to leave that big statement out there for a minute, and just to make sure that you know that I knew that I said it when I said it. KELLEY: Okay, well, actually I wanna echo, uh, Fred’s sentiments, that it’s really an honor to be here, in this space. Um, this is the second time that we’ve had kind of a public conversation, and it’s always packed, you know, and it’s always a lot of people, and expectations are always high, and one of my favorite things on the planet, besides just talking to my daughters, talking to Fred Moten, um, you know, and it’s just really, you know, I learn so much from it, and in fact, let me just begin by saying that one of the pieces that Rinaldo was referring to was an essay I wrote called, uh, “Black Study, Black Struggle,” which was entirely inspired by, uh, Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s, uh, book, “The Undercommons.” It was a way of the application of the notion of the undercommons to understanding what was happening at that moment, which in, in the fall of 2015, there was like an explosion of, um, Black protests on, on campus, and, you know, I won’t repeat what’s in the article, uh, but it, it’s not an accident that some of those struggles, uh, were products of what was happening in the streets. In other words, what happened in Ferguson, and what happened in Baltimore, what happened all over the country, and what happened in places like here in Toronto, were the catalyst for, um, a kind of explosion on campuses, where, uh, students were trying to figure out their place in the university. They’re dealing with racism, and microaggressions on university campuses, uh, they’re dealing with a, a kind of deracinated, you know, curriculum where ethnic studies wasn’t what it was, in its inception. Um, and, I was also dealing with, or many of us were also dealing with, uh, a culture of, and I hate to put it this way, but a culture of anti-intellectualism in, in a different sort of way. I mean, universities are often anti-intellectual, in that they actually disavow certain forms of knowledge and put other knowledge above that, which is an anti-intellectual position by the way. Um, but then when you’re assaulted by that all the time, uh, sometimes you end up mirroring that culture. And you’re saying “well I’m not gonna read this, I’m not gonna read that, because so-and-so wrote it,” as opposed to saying that there’s nothing off the table, uh, that Black studies, and Fred knows this ‘cause he repeats it more than I do, that our mutual, uh, teacher, Cedric Robinson, who paraphrased C. L. R. James, said you know, Black studies is a critique of Western civilization, and if that is the case, then we both have to dismantle it, recognize the weak edifice upon which it’s built, but also know everything that’s happening within it. But anyway, let me just back up, um, so, I just, so the three points I wanna make in reference to the question, one is that, uh, social movements have always been the catalyst for Black studies. When Fred was talking about, you know, Black studies as, as, uh, kinda, kinda like a way of life, as an atmosphere in which he grew up and which I grew up and many of us grew up, that’s so true. I never thought about it that way, but, you know, that’s so true. And in fact, um, if anything, Black Studies is not a multidiscipline but a project, a project for liberation, whatever that means, and liberation is an ongoing project. Um, Ruthie Gilmore, uh, who was at USC, uh, with me and Fred, had come up with this idea of renaming ethnic studies “liberation studies.” And, you know, we were actually serious about that, we were like, trying to figure out how to do that, and never filled it, but it reminds us that, you know, it’s not about, um, it’s not about a body. It’s not about bodies. It’s about ideas, and about the future, you know. It’s about recognizing the past and the construction of a new future. And so I think, in that respect, in order to understand the future of Black studies, we gotta understand the movements that produced it—that, that the Movement for Black Lives, that, um, uh, We Charge Genocide, that Black Youth Projects 100—all these struggles that erupted have, in fact, uh, pointed the way for Black Studies. The problem is, is that what gets constituted as the institutional space of Black studies, in many cases, isn’t really that. And I hate to bring people down, because we’re supposed to be up, right? But there are a lot of departments that I wouldn't call Black studies departments that have that name, you know, there are a lot of, there's a lot of scholarship that goes on that has no relationship at all to the project of transformation, or to people, to actual people in community. And one of the important things to always remember is that, um, we wouldn't have Black studies if it wasn't—in the United States, that is, I'm talking about the US—if it wasn't for Watts, if it wasn't for Detroit in 67, and if it wasn't for those kinds of urban rebellions, if it wasn't for the struggles in the South, that's where Black studies comes from. Uh, and so it moves into the university as a, as a transformative project. Um, it's not—and that's why I think there was a disconnect between some of the, the protests and what was happening in the academy. Finally, there’s this question of, of ethnic studies versus, or against, or for, or within or bedded in Black studies. And one of the things that, that I think a lot of us are trying to figure out is to deepen the relationship between indigenous studies and Black studies. Um, to understand that this was what I call second wave ethnic studies in the 1990s was itself a project that was, believe it or not, in a, a response to neoliberalism. And I think we don't always see that because we, we tend to read backwards in the 1990s and 1980s as, like, ethnic studies as identity politics in the narrowest sense of the word, that somehow this was about producing a sense of, of pride and a sense of identity devoid of the question of power. But if you actually look at the struggles for ethnic studies in the 80s and 90s, it was all about power. That, that what we think of as comparative or critical ethnic studies was, wasn't about the celebration of difference. It wasn't liberal multiculturalism. It was an assault on a neoliberal turn. And we, we sometimes forget that and, and, and then we write the history. And so I think I want to at some point talk more about that, but I think that's something to remember, because, right now, if we don't have Black studies as a critique in response to the neoliberal neofascist turn, then it's sort of worthless. You know, it's going to continue to exist. Maybe not in the academy though. So I'll just stop there. WALCOTT: So, um, Robin, where you ended, and, and where Fred began, it’s a, is a good segue into getting you, both of you, to talk about the work that you've been doing around questions of Palestinian struggle and freedom. Fred, the work that, the tremendous work that you did in the ASA, um, American Studies Association, for which the Association is still living true, and, and Robin the work that you continue to do with um, um, with faculty for Palestine. But I'm thinking about Fred's provocation here that Black studies about saving the Earth and if Black studies is indeed about saving the Earth, which I'm very willing to fall right into right now, you know, first to kind of maybe think about this relationship between the struggle and, and freedom of Palestine and the relationship between ongoing settler colonialisms globally, because it seems to me that one of the most powerful things that, um, the kind of Black studies that has taken to the streets recently has done is to make those kinds of concerns present, right? BLM visits to Palestine, BLM in Toronto, always making sure that the invocation of the politics of settler colonialism is a part of a political organizing, and, um, their intimate relations with indigenous communities. So maybe this is a way for us to begin to talk about what's really at stake in this contemporary political moment where, um, or, or a radical politics, a politics that wants to think a different kind of future formation, is grappling with, um, settler colonialism in various kinds of ways. But Palestine being central to that, given that we know as we sit in this university is that often, um, what we call our senior administrators have an entirely different relationship with the question of freedom for Palestine. MOTEN: Well, um, first, I mean, the work I did around, um, you know, the ASA’s, um, you know, decision to endorse the academic and cultural boycott of Israel was really minimal and minor compared to a lot of other people who were really out front, um, and, and have been working tirelessly for that for many, many years. Um, and I think, you know, the, my contribution was more, you know, rhetorical in many ways in, in, in, and, and maybe, maybe theoretical only in the most minimal sense, in the sense that what I wanted to do was a couple of things. First, to recognize that, um, you know, let's say that the conditions of what people call modernity, um, in, in, in, in, or global modernity, that the fundamental conditions that make that up are, you know, settler colonialism. And I think we can talk about settler colonialism in ways that are broader than the normal way that we usually think of them as a set of violent and brutal relations between Europe and the rest of the world. Because I think it's really important. And, and, and again, our, our mutual friend and mentor Cedric Robinson, pointed this out emphatically, and in brilliant ways early on, that settler colonialism is also an intra-Eu

ropean affair. Um, and it's important to understand that. It's important to understand this historic relationship between settler colonialism in the enclosure of the commons, um, which is part and, part of the origins of, of what we now know or understand as capitalism. But if we understand that settler colonialism, that the transatlantic slave trade, um, and that, you know, the emergence of a set of philosophical formulations that essentially provide for us some modern conception of self that has as its basis a kind of possessive, heteronormative, patriarchal individuation, right? That's what it is to be yourself on the most fundamental level. You know, and if you ask anybody in the philosophy department, they'll tell you that that's true, you know, and they won’t be joking, right, that, um, that, these, that these constitute the basis of, of our modernity. But for most of the people who live in the world, actually for everybody who lives in the world, although most of the people in live in the world are actually able to both recognize this and say this, that modernity is a social and ecological disaster that we live, that we now attempt to survive. Okay? And if we take that up, then part of what's at stake is that we recognize that feminist and queer interventions against heteronormative patriarchy, that Black interventions against the theory and practice of slavery, which is ongoing, that indigenous interventions against settler colonialism constitute the general both practical and intellectual basis for not only our attempts to survive, but also our attempts to, as I said before, save the Earth. And, and I put it in terms that the great poet Ed Roberson puts it; not just to save the Earth, but to see the Earth before the end of the world. And this is an emergency that we're in now and it's urgent. Um, and I believe that there’s a specific convergence of black thought and indigenous thought that situates itself precisely in relation to, and is articulated through, the interventions of queer thought and feminist thought that we want to take up. And, and it, and it strikes me as, for me at least, it's, it's a way of taking up a kind an—it's, it’s a way of imagining how one might be able to, how we might be able to walk more lightly on the Earth. To honor the Earth as we walk on it, as we stand on it. To not stomp on it, to not stomp all over it, where every step you take is a claim of ownership. And, and this is one way to put it, would be to not so presumptuously imagine that the Earth can be reduced to something so paltry and so viciously understood as what we usually call home. This is part of the reason why the queer and the feminist critique is so important. It's a critique of a general problematic notion of domesticity. It's like another way of being on the Earth that doesn't allow you in some vicious and brutal way to claim that it is yours, right? Um, this is important and this is so, you know, often the methods that we use to claim the Earth as ours involved fences, borders. This manifests itself on a private level from household to household, but it also manifests itself on a national level, and at the level of the nation state, and it's not an accident that settler colonial states take it upon themselves to imagine themselves to be the living embodiment of the legitimacy of the nation state as a political and social form. For me, there's two reasons to be in solidarity with the people of Palestine. One is because they're human beings and they're being treated with absolute brutality, but the other is that there's a specific resistance to Israel as a nation state. And for my money, to be perfectly clear about this, I believe that this nation state of Israel is itself an artifact of antisemitism. If we thought about Israel and Zionism, not just as a form of racism that results in the displacement of Palestinians, but if we also think about them as artifacts of the historic displacement of Jews from Europe, right, in the same way that we might think of, let's say Sierra Leone or Liberia as artifacts of racist displacement, okay. If we think about it that way, okay, and another, and the reason I'm saying this is just to make sure that you know that there's a possible argument against the formulation that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic when we know that Donald Trump is a staunch supporter, that people like Pat Robertson in the United States are staunch supporters that help us to the fact that you can be deeply anti-Semitic and support the state of Israel. These things go together. They're not antithetical to one another. So that it becomes important for us to be able to suggest that resistance to the state of Israel is also resistance to the idea of the legitimacy of the nation state. It's not an accident that Israel has taken upon itself, that when Israel takes upon itself, when the defense of Israel manifests itself as a defense of its right to exist, this is important. It's a defense, not just of Israel's right to exist, but of the nation state as a political form’s right to exist. And nation states don't have rights. What they're supposed to be are mechanisms to protect the rights of the people who live in them, and that has almost never been the case, and to the extent that they do protect the rights of the people who live in them, it's in the expense, it's at the expense of the people who don't, okay. So part of what's at stake, one of the reasons why it's at, it's important to pay particular attention to this issue, why we ought to resist the ridiculous formulation that singling out Israel at this moment is itself anti-Semitic is because it's important to recognize that Israel is the state. [KELLEY: Right.] MOTEN: For reasons that I think are totally bound up with antisemitism, right? Israel is the state that, insofar as it makes the claim about its right to exist, is also making the claim about the nation state’s right to exist as such. It's this, it's that same kind of argument that, I remembered the—and I'm sorry to keep going on so long, but there's—there's those formulations that people often make about Black people in it or indigenous people as if they were the essence of the human, right, so that every time Black people or indigenous people do something that supposedly we're not supposed to do, it constitutes a violation to the very idea of the human. Right, because somehow as a function of the nobility of our suffering, we constitute the very idea of humanity, right? And there's nothing more brutal, right? Nothing more vicious than having been being consigned to that position. Similarly, Israel as a function of anti-Semitism has now been placed in the position of protecting the very idea of the nation state. So for me, first and foremost, it's important to have solidarity with the Palestinian people, but second of all, it's important to actually have some solidarity with the Jewish people insofar as they can and must be separated from the Israeli state because ultimately the fate of the Jewish people, if it is tied to this, to the nation state of Israel, will be more brutal than anything that has yet been done or can be imagined, and I mean everything that you think I mean when I say that.

## Case

### Theft Fails---1NR

#### Analyzing state-level politics is a prerequisite to effectuate change at any level.

Levi Bryant 12, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” Larval Subjects, 09/15/2012, https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you ~~guys~~ behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

### AT: State Bad

#### Intersectional politics working within institutions for black women alleviates violence and recuperates institutions.

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Kimberlé Crenshaw had no way of knowing that she was naming intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry and praxis when, in the early 1990s, she published her two groundbreaking articles on intersectionality (Crenshaw  1989,  1991). Crenshaw’s scholarly articles constitute an important turning point in the shifting relationships between activist and academic communities (see e.g. Collins and Bilge  2016, pp. 65–77). Social movements in the mid‐twentieth century pushed for institutional transformation in housing, education, employment, and health care. Transforming educational institutions and the knowledge they embodied was central to these initiatives. Indigenous peoples, African Americans, women, LGBTQ people, Latinos/as, and similarly subordinated groups challenged both the substance of knowledge about their experiences and the power arrangements within primary schools, high schools, colleges, and universities that catalyzed such knowledge. Many such groups produced oppositional or resistant knowledge that was grounded in their own experiences and that challenged prevailing interpretations of them (see Collins 2019, chap. 3). Higher education was an important site for social transformation. Calls for transforming curricular practices within the academy stimulated an array of programs that embarked on a similar mission of institutional transformation (Collins and Bilge 2016, pp. 77–81; Dill and Zambrana 2009).

Within contemporary neoliberal sensibilities, the commitment to the idea of social transformation within mid‐twentieth‐century social movements can be hard to understand. Yet a broader understanding of the meaning of resistance to subordinated people suggests that Black people, indigenous peoples, women, Latinx, LGBTQ people, differently abled people, religious and ethnic minorities, and stateless people continue to see transforming social institutions as necessary. Claims for social transformation can seem to be idealistic and naive, yet with hindsight, aspirations for social transformation in prior eras inform contemporary realities. Specifically, many of the visible changes within colleges and universities over the past several decades reflect prior efforts at institutional transformation (Dill  2009; Mihesuah and Wilson 2004; Parker et al. 2010).

In a 2009 interview, Crenshaw reflected on the experiences that led her to use the term intersectionality within the broader social conditions of the times. For Crenshaw, her activism in college and law school revealed the inadequacies of both anti‐racism and feminist perspectives, limitations that left both political projects unable to fully address the social problems that each aimed to remedy. There seemed to be no language that could resolve conflicts between anti‐racist social movements that were, in Crenshaw’s words, “deeply sexist and patriarchal”; and feminist activism, where “race reared its head in a somewhat parallel way” (Guidroz and Berger 2009, p. 63). For Crenshaw, informed social action within both movements required new angles of vision. This particular social problem propelled Crenshaw’s search for provisional language that she could use to analyze and redress the limitations of monocategorical thinking regarding both race and gender. Crenshaw describes what she had in mind when she introduced the term intersectionality:

That was the activist engagement that brought me to this work. And my own use of the term “intersectionality” was just a metaphor [italics added], I’m amazed at how it gets over‐ and underused; sometimes I can’t even recognize it in the literature anymore. I was simply looking at the way all these systems of oppression overlap. But more importantly, how in the process of that structural convergence rhetorical politics and identity politics – based on the idea that systems of subordination do not overlap‐would abandon issues and causes and people who actually were affected by overlapping systems of subordination. I’ve always been interested in both the structural convergence and the political marginality. That’s how I came into it. (Guidroz and Berger 2009, p. 65)

For Crenshaw, intersectionality named the structural convergence among intersecting systems of power that created blind spots in anti‐racist and feminist activism. Crenshaw counseled that anti‐racist and feminist movements would be compromised as long as they saw their struggles as separate and not intertwined. Significantly, racism and sexism not only fostered social inequalities, they marginalized individuals and groups that did not fit comfortably within race‐only, gender‐only monocategorical frameworks. Women of color remained politically marginalized within both movements, an outcome that both reflected the harm done by racism and sexism, and limited the political effectiveness of both movements. Crenshaw’s understanding of the term intersectionality is important for subsequent use of the term. Her work suggests that, from its inception, the idea of intersectionality worked in multiple registers of recognizing the significance of social structural arrangements of power, how individual and group experiences reflect those structural intersections, and how political marginality might engender new subjectivities and agency (Collins and Bilge 2016, pp. 71–77).

By now it is widely accepted that intersectionality is the term that has stuck. Of all the words that Crenshaw could have selected, and of all the idioms that might have resonated with intersectionality’s adherents, why did this specific term resonate with so many people when Crenshaw first used it? Crenshaw’s comment that her use of the term intersectionality was “just a metaphor” provides an important clue.

Many people think of metaphors as literary devices that are confined to fiction and essays. Yet metaphors are also important in shaping how people understand and participate in social relations. As a foundation of thinking and action, metaphors help people understand and experience one kind of thing in terms of another. A metaphor can spark an instant sense of understanding, fostering an immediate sense of the formerly unknown in terms of the known.2 In essence, the capacity to think and act is metaphorical in nature (Trout 2010, p. 3). As metaphor, intersectionality named an ongoing communicative process of trying to understand race in terms of gender, or gender in terms of class. Rather than following the chain of metaphors (race is like and unlike gender), the metaphor of intersectionality provided a shortcut that built on existing sensibilities in order to see interconnections.

Cultural theorist Stuart Hall provides another clue as to why intersectionality as a particular metaphor traveled so quickly. In an article published in the 1990s, Hall argues that metaphors are often linked to social transformation, ways that people can move from the familiar to imagining the unfamiliar. Hall posits that metaphors of social transformation must do at least two things: “They allow us to imagine what it would be like when prevailing cultural values are challenged and transformed, the old social hierarchies are overthrown, old standards and norms disappear. . . and new meanings and values, social and cultural configurations begin to appear. However, such metaphors must also have analytic value. They must somehow provide ways of thinking about the relation between the social and symbolic domains in this process of transformation” (Hall 1996, p. 287).

As a metaphor of social transformation, intersectionality invokes both elements. It arrived in the midst of ongoing struggles to resist social inequalities brought about by racism, sexism, colonialism, capitalism, and similar systems of power. The metaphor of intersectionality could move among and through these forms of domination, providing a snapshot view of their sameness and difference as a way to see their interconnections. Intersectionality as metaphor did not proscribe what social transformation would look like, or even the best way of getting there. Instead, using intersectionality as a metaphor provided analytic value in linking social structures and the ideas that reproduce them – in Hall’s terms, the ties between the social and symbolic domains of social change. For people who, like Crenshaw, were interested in social transformation, the metaphor of intersectionality expressed the aspirations of the time.

Crenshaw’s metaphor was recognizable to many people because it invoked the tangible, spatial relations of everyday life. Everyone is located in physical space, and everyone has had to follow a path or move through an intersection of some sort. People could pick up the metaphor, imagining different kinds of pathways and crossroads, and use intersectionality as a metaphor to understand very different things. The idea of an intersection where two or more pathways meet is a familiar idea in physical, geographic space. The roads or pathways need not be straight or paved to invoke this sense of a spatial intersection. All cultures have intersections or places where people cross paths, whether superhighways or barely marked paths in a forest. Moreover, the places where people cross paths are often meeting places, spaces where different kinds of people engage one another. Being in an intersection or moving through one is a familiar experience. This spatial metaphor also invokes the idea of seeing several possible pathways from the vantage point within the intersection, and being faced with the decision of which path to take. In this sense, the spatial metaphor itself is open‐ended and subject to many interpretations. Intersectionality as a metaphor worked so well because it was simultaneously familiar yet highly elastic.

This spatial metaphor that could be seen in the material world implicitly advanced a more abstract theoretical claim about social structure – namely, that the places where systems of power converged potentially provide better explanations for social phenomena than those that ignored such intersections. Racism and sexism may be conceptualized as distinctive structural phenomena, yet examining them from where they intersect provides new angles of vision of each system of power as well as how they cross and diverge from one another. Politically, the idea of intersectionality also worked. The term intersectionality encapsulated the convergence of multiple social justice projects and long‐standing critical practices within academia.

Crenshaw’s use of the term intersectionality as a metaphor for structuring her argument tapped into this power of metaphor to provide a snapshot view of complex social relations during a time of considerable social change. Significantly, Crenshaw’s metaphor was not confined to explaining racism, sexism, and similar systems of power. The metaphor of intersectionality emerged in the context of solving social problems brought on by multiple and seemingly separate systems of power. In her careful reading of Crenshaw’s signature articles on intersectionality, philosopher Anna Carastathis (2014) examines how Crenshaw used intersectionality as a “provisional” concept to frame her argument about resistance to oppression. For those involved in activist projects, intersectionality enabled those who used the term to understand, for example, a familiar racism in terms of an unfamiliar sexism, or a familiar violence against women of color as individuals in terms of a less familiar analysis of state‐sanctioned violence of colonialism. Using intersectionality as a metaphor offered an invitation to an array of social actors who were thinking about similar things within different social locations and from varying vantage points.

When Crenshaw dismissed intersectionality as just a metaphor, she could not foresee the impact of this particular metaphor in informing critical inquiry and social change. Instead, Crenshaw’s use of intersectionality seemingly provided the right metaphor at the right time. As intersectionality has grown, the importance of its metaphoric thinking has become clearer. Crenshaw’s use of intersectionality as a metaphor was not incidental to intersectionality’s subsequent development, but rather proved to be a fundamental pillar within intersectionality’s cognitive architecture and critical thinking.

Why Metaphors Matter

If naming the ideas that intersectionality invokes were as simple as choosing from a predetermined array of terms that had already undergone academic scrutiny, it would make sense to debate intersectionality’s merits in this universe of alternative terms. Intersectionality may not be the best metaphor for explaining social phenomena, but it is the one that has persisted. Some scholars recognize the significance of intersectionality as metaphor, yet offer alternatives to it that seemingly do a better job of explaining social reality. For example, Ivy Ken’s (2008) use of sugar as a metaphor aims for a more historically grounded, fluid understanding of intersectionality. Mapping how sugar as idea and product weaves throughout historical and contemporary relationships of capitalism, racism, and sexism, Ken’s metaphor of sugar is an innovative, alternative entry point into the constellation of ideas referenced by intersectionality. Sugar may be a better fit for the ideas that intersectionality invokes, but pragmatically, would it have worked as well?

The puzzle to be explained here concerns why the term intersectionality continues to resonate with so many people as a preferred way of conceptualizing an amorphous set of ideas. Can sugar as metaphor do the same metaphoric work as intersectionality? Conceptual metaphor theory helps explain why intersectionality as a metaphor persists. Intersectionality as metaphor provides a cognitive device for thinking about social inequality within power relations. It asks people to think beyond familiar race‐only or gender‐only perspectives in order to take a new look at social problems. Intersectionality as metaphor also provides a framework for drawing upon what people already know about racism to learn about sexism and vice versa. As metaphor, intersectionality suggests that racism and sexism are connected, the first step in establishing conceptual correspondences between these two constructs. Using intersectionality as a metaphor breaks down monocategorical analyses to focus on the conceptual correspondences or relationships among racism and sexism. And this process need not end with just race and gender.

Intersectionality may not have started out as a core conceptual metaphor for understanding social inequality, but over time, it has increasingly functioned as one. Just as creating social meanings in everyday life relies upon metaphors, theoretical knowledge also relies in some fashion on metaphorical thinking in constructing knowledge. In her classic work Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?, feminist philosopher Sandra Harding examines how metaphors have played an important role in modeling nature and in specifying the appropriate domain of a theory (1991, pp. 84–85). Harding points out that metaphors are important dimensions of doing social theory, the case, for example, of imagining society in metaphorical terms – society as a machine, an organism, or a computer  –  and by implication, changing the core metaphor of a field changes its theoretical orientation to the social world. Originally offered in the context of critical science studies, this critical perspective advanced within feminist philosophy preceded more recent attention to metaphors as an important dimension of social theorizing (Abbott 2004; Swedberg 2014). For example, in his volume The Art of Social Theory, Richard Swedberg remarks on these connections between metaphors in everyday life and within the sophisticated process of theorizing: “Metaphors abound in everyday language, in the arts as well as in the sciences. Their power can be immense, as evidenced by the metaphor of the brain as a computer. This metaphor is generally seen as having helped cognitive science come into being” (2014, p. 89). In this sense, Crenshaw’s reflection that intersectionality is just a metaphor underestimates the power of conceptual metaphors for critical analysis.

Intersectionality’s metaphor of the connectedness of different systems of power has proven to be an important one for theorizing power relations and political identities. For example, Norocel’s (2013) study of the radical right populist movement in Sweden provides an important example of an explicit use both of conceptual metaphor theory and of intersectionality as a metaphor. Norocel examines how the radical right used the idea of Folkhem (the home of [Swedish] people) as a conceptual metaphor to ground their political project. As a metaphor, Folkhem helped structure radical right masculinities, specifically heteronormative masculinities, at the intersection of gender, class, and race. Norocel identifies the significance of conceptual metaphor theory for this project: “The choice of a certain conceptual metaphor in a specific social context . . . has a crucial impact on how we structure reality, determining what is explained and . . . what is left outside this framework of intelligibility, thereby highlighting the various power relations at work in that particular discourse . . .. In other words, the analysis of metaphors needs to be undertaken whilst bearing in mind the very discourse in which they are embedded” (p. 9). In Norocel’s study, the idea of gender, class, race, and sexuality provided a framing metaphor that could be extended to explain a political phenomenon in a specific national context.

Feminist theorist Chela Sandoval also recognizes the significance of metaphors for theorizing power relations. In a section titled “Power in Metaphors” in her signature book Methodology of the Oppressed (2000), Sandoval describes how different metaphors highlight important distinctions between hierarchical and postmodern understandings of power. Imagining power relations as a hierarchical pyramid differs dramatically from imagining power relations through a flat, spatial metaphor of centers and margins. Sandoval notes that the shift away from a hierarchical, “sovereign model” of power enables power to be figured as a force that circulates horizontally:

As in the previous, sovereign, pyramidal model of power, the location of every citizen‐ subject can be distinctly mapped on this postmodern, flattened, horizontal power grid according to attributes as race, class, gender, age, or sexual orientation, but this reterritorialized circulation of power redifferentiates groups, and sorts identities differently. Because they are horizontally located, it appears as if such politicized identities‐as‐positions can equally access their own racial‐, sexual‐, national‐, or gender‐unique forms of social power. Such constituencies are then perceived as speaking “democratically” to and against each other in a lateral, horizontal‐not pyramidal‐exchange, although from spatially differing geographic, class, age, sex, race, or gender locations. (pp. 72–73)

This metaphoric shift has important implications for intersectionality (Collins 2018). Intersectionality as a core conceptual metaphor has traveled well, stimulating much innovative work within intersectionality. Yet the use of metaphoric thinking for intersectional analysis raises several questions. Do some aspects of intersectionality as metaphor work better in addressing certain social problems and less well with others? What experiences would people need to bring to the metaphoric use of intersectionality for it to have meaning?

Critics raise a valid point about the limits of intersectionality as a metaphor when used to invoke the image of a literal crossroads. In her signature book Borderlands/ La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987), Chicana feminist writer Gloria Anzaldúa expands upon the metaphor of intersectionality as a literal crossroads managed by traffic cops to that of the borderlands as a meeting place. The borderlands is simultaneously a place, reflecting the social relations of the physical border that influenced Anzaldua’s experiences growing up in south Texas. In this sense, borderlands are structural places that reflect hierarchical power relations and lie outside acceptable categories of belonging (Yuval‐Davis 2011). Borderland spaces show the working of hierarchical power relations, or the sedimented effects of, in Sandoval’s words, a “sovereign, pyramidal model of power.” But Anzaldúa’s borderland is simultaneously a way of describing the experiences of navigating marginal, liminal, and outsider within spaces that are created by multiple kinds of borders. This is the potential for “democratic” exchanges within borderland or intersectional spaces.

Anzaldúa’s work illustrates the possibilities and limitations of spatial metaphors of power. As AnaLouise Keating points out, Anzaldúa is generally defined as a “Chicana lesbian‐feminist” author, but Anzaldúa described herself more broadly as being on various thresholds, simultaneously inside and outside multiple collectivities. Anzaldúa both maintains multiple allegiances and locates herself in multiple worlds:

“Your allegiance is to La Raza, the Chicano movement;” say the members of my race. “Your allegiance is to the Third World;” say my Black and Asian friends. “Your allegiance is to your gender, to women;” say the feminists. Then there’s my allegiance to the Gay movement, to the socialist revolution, to the New Age, to magic and the occult. And there’s my affinity of literature, to the world of the artist. What am I? A third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings. They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. (Keating 2009, p. 2)

Anzaldúa uses her experiences with multiple groups as the foundation of her analysis, yet she is less interested in finding freedom by extracting herself from multiple groups in order to find herself, but rather in understanding how her sameness and difference across multiple groups fosters new experiences of self. As Keating describes this positioning, “Although each group makes membership contingent on its own often exclusionary set of rules and demands, Anzaldúa refuses all such terms without rejecting the people or groups themselves” (2009, p. 2). For Anzaldúa, the borderlands suggests a place not simply to house experiences but also a way of working, both politically and intellectually.

Intersectionality may be the metaphor that has taken hold as the descriptor to describe the field itself, yet the spatial metaphor of the borderland also deepens understandings of intersecting power relations. Anzaldúa’s work links experiences, spatial metaphors, power, and political engagement, signaling an important approach to critical theorizing. In discussing the significance of Gloria Anzaldúa’s work within intersectionality, Patrick R. Grzanka describes Anzaldúa’s “borderland” metaphor as signifying a geographic, affective, cultural, and political landscape that cannot be explained by binary logic (black/white, gay/straight, Mexican/American, etc.) or even the notion of liminality, that is, the space between. For Anzaldúa, the borderlands are a very real space of actual social relations that cannot be captured within existing social theory. Grzanka describes the connections between the metaphor of intersectionality and that of the borderlands: “Anzaldúa’s work exemplifies the concept of intersectionality perhaps better than the traffic intersection metaphor so central to the field and to Crenshaw’s initial articulation of the concept, because Anzaldúa denies any logic that presumes there were ever discreet dimensions of difference that collided at some particular point: in the borderlands, mixing, hybridity, unfinished synthesis, and unpredictable amalgamation were always already happening, and are forever ongoing” (2014, pp. 106–107). In this sense, the concept of the borderlands illustrates the power of metaphor that, in this case, not only complements but also deepens intersectionality’s metaphoric posture.

As metaphors, neither intersectionality nor the idea of the borderlands provide coherence, consistency, or closure. Both travel, sometimes working in tandem for some projects and apart in others. They illustrate that when a concept is structured by a metaphor, it is only partially structured and can be extended in some ways but not in others (Trout 2010, p. 13). Metaphors provide a holistic mental picture of interrelated phenomena as well as new insights into and angles of vision on social relations. Heuristics offer tools for investigating the ideas that emerge through intersectionality’s metaphoric thinking. Heuristics provide thinking tools that are typically used to solve problems.

Intersectionality’s Heuristic Thinking

Using intersectionality as a heuristic has facilitated the rethinking of existing knowledge – namely, social problems such as violence, social institutions such as work and family, and important social constructs such as identity. Kimberlé Crenshaw’s classic article “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color” (1991) illustrates the heuristic use of intersectionality for rethinking existing knowledge concerning violence as a social problem. Crenshaw’s immediate concern lay in analyzing violence against women of color, with the goal of strengthening grassroots and legal responses to it. Lacking the term intersectionality, Crenshaw draws upon the existing heuristic of race/class/gender as interconnected phenomena as a starting point for problem‐ solving concerning violence. In this regard, her approach illustrates the use of intersectionality (the race/class/gender heuristic) as a way to generate usable knowledge for social science as an instrument for “social problem solving” (Lindblom and Cohen 1979, p. 4).

Yet, in the context of using the race/class/gender heuristic, she recognizes its limitations for her particular project and adapts it for her specific context. Crenshaw kept the idea of intersectionality, yet incorporated categories that were a better fit for the women of color under consideration. Specifically, Crenshaw underemphasizes class as an explanatory category that explains violence against women of color. Instead, she includes the category of “immigrant status”; itself a construct invoking discourses of nation (citizenship status) and ethnicity (culture as proxy for color, race, and often religion). Via this adaptation, Crenshaw argues that the provisional combination of race, gender, and immigrant status better fit the experiences of the group in question as well as the social problems with violence that they encountered. Yet neither the existing race/class/gender framework nor the new framework that emphasizes race, gender, and immigrant status was by itself sufficient. Crenshaw then offers the term intersectionality as a way to respond to the challenge of solving social problems that could not be incorporated within the race/class/gender rubric. This shift from race/class/gender to intersectionality illustrates the utility of heuristics – ironically, in this case, in naming intersectionality itself.

Analyses of violence, as well as the intersectional categories that have been used to study it, have expanded tremendously since Crenshaw’s signature article. Because violence against women has been such a powerful catalyst for intersectionality itself, intersectional analyses of this topic are not only widespread but have also informed political activism and public policy (Collins and Bilge 2016, pp. 48–55). Analyses of violence that draw upon intersectionality reappear across a wide array of topics, such as the nation-state violence of militarism and war (Peterson 2007), the treatment of sexual violence and ethnicity in international criminal law (Buss 2009), and hate speech itself as part of relations of violence (Matsuda et al. 1993). Solutions to violence against women remain unlikely if violence against women is imagined through monocategorical lenses such as the gender lenses of male perpetrators and female victims, or racial lenses that elevate police violence against African American men over domestic violence against African American women. Viewing violence through an intersectional lens potentially creates new forms of transversal politics to confront it (Collins 2017b).

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One strength of heuristic thinking concerns its ease of use for criticizing existing knowledge and posing new questions. For example, when it comes to the study of work, asking simple questions such as, “Does this apply to women?” or “Is slave labor included in the definition of work?” or “Why are white male workers the focus of studies of work?” identifies areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in understandings of work. The experiences of a particular group of working‐class, white, male industrial workers or middle‐class, white, male corporate managers and executives have garnered the lion’s share of scholarly attention. What are the effects of treating findings on this particular group as universal in work‐related scholarship? The effectiveness of heuristic thinking lies in its simplicity – its use shifts established perspectives on scholarship and practice. The heuristic of asking how an intersectional framework would shift what is considered to be fixed, and fix what has been in flux, signals a sea change in how to do scholarship.

The now commonsense idea that individual identity is shaped by multiple factors whose saliency changes from one social context to the next owes much to intersectionality’s ease of use as a heuristic. On a basic level, an individual need no longer ask, “Am I Black or am I a woman or am I a lesbian first?” The answer of being simultaneously Black and a woman and a lesbian expands this space of subjectivity to encompass multiple aspects of individual identity. Rather than a fixed, essentialist identity that a person carries from one situation to the next, individual identities are now seen as differentially performed from one social context to the next (Butler 1990). The process of crafting a unique sense of self that rests on multiple possibilities generated new questions about how those identities were interconnected and coforming, rather than how they were or should be ranked.3

Intersectionality is not a theory of identity, but many scholars and intellectual activists understand it through this lens primarily because the heuristic use of intersectionality as applied to the topic of identity is commonplace. Given the inordinate attention devoted to identity and its seeming association with intersectionality, returning to Stuart Hall’s work, written about the same time as Butler’s, may be helpful. Unlike Butler, Hall contends that the performative nature of identity and the frameworks of social structures both matter: “Identity is not a set of fixed attributes, the unchanging essence of the inner self, but a constantly shifting process of positioning. We tend to think of identity as taking us back to our roots, the part of us which remains essentially the same across time. In fact identity is always a never‐completed process of becoming – a process of shifting identifications, rather than a singular, complete, finished state of being” (Hall 2017, p. 16). Other scholarship examines identity in relation to social inequality and political action, such as the possibilities of identity categories as potential coalitions (Carastathis 2013), or case studies on how attending to intersecting identities creates solidarity and cohesion for cross‐movement mobilization within participatory democracies (Palacios 2016).

Using intersectionality as a heuristic not only has facilitated the rethinking of existing knowledge‐violence and similar social problems, work and similar social institutions, as well as identity and similar social constructs – it has also brought new systems of power into view. Intersectional analysis now incorporates sexuality, ethnicity, age, ability, and nation as similar categories of analysis (Kim‐Puri  2005). Specifically, increased attention to the themes of nation, nationalism, nation‐state, and national identity has aimed to align the power relations of nation with structural analyses of racism, capitalism, and patriarchy (Yuval‐Davis 1997). Literature on the nation‐state and its citizenship policies has benefited from intersectional frameworks, the case of Goldberg’s (2002) analysis of the racial state, or Evelyn Glenn’s (2002) study of work, American citizenship, and nation‐state power. Intersectional frameworks have also deepened understandings of nationalist ideologies, as evidenced in Joane Nagel’s (1998) analysis of masculinity and nationalism, or George Mosse’s (1985) classic work on nationalism and sexuality. The political behavior of subordinated groups as they aim to empower themselves has also garnered intersectional analysis, for example, Ana RamosZayas’s (Ramos‐Zayas 2003) ethnographic study of Puerto Rican identity within a Chicago neighborhood that illustrates the benefits of incorporating nationalism in studies of local politics. Intersectional analyses of nation‐state power have expanded to consider transnational processes, for example, placing analyses of transnational tourism within intersectional processes of erotic autonomy, decolonization, and nationalism (Alexander 1997, 2005).

At some point, one bumps up against the limitations of heuristic thinking. In this sense, the ways in which race/class/gender studies have unfolded since the 1980s can serve as a cautionary tale for the vast amount of data that is currently being produced by the heuristic use of intersectionality. Race/class/gender studies laid substantial groundwork for intersectionality’s metaphoric and heuristic use. Scholars and activists working in race/class/ gender studies, and similar interdisciplinary endeavors routinely used the phrase “race, class, and gender” for a wide array of projects (Andersen and Collins 2016; Collins and Bilge 2016). The heuristic use of “race, class, and gender” as a provisional, place‐holder term across the myriad projects that  sprang up within and across academic disciplines catalyzed considerable scholarship. Viewing race, class, and gender as interconnected phenomena seemingly shared a loose set of assumptions: (i) race, class, and gender referenced not singular but intersecting systems of power; (ii) specific social inequalities reflect these power relations from one setting to the next; (iii) individual and collective (group) identities of race, gender, class, and sexuality are socially constructed within multiple systems of power; and (iv) social problems and their remedies are similarly intersecting phenomena. Each of these assumptions served as jumping off points for a range of  projects. Intersectionality drew from and expanded the heuristic use of these assumptions that underlay race/class/gender studies.

Race/class/gender studies and intersectionality both rely on heuristic thinking, yet while it may seem that they are interchangeable, they do have distinctive approaches to social problem solving. Using the framework of race/class/gender analysis reminds researchers to attend to race, class, and gender as particular categories of analysis. Either singularly or in combination, the categories of race, class, and gender identify distinctive structural foundations for social inequalities, for example, the racism of white supremacy, the class exploitation associated with capitalism, and the sexism inherent in patriarchy. Race, class, and gender not only reference specific systems of power; each category has its own storied traditions of scholarship and activism done by interpretive communities that developed around each category. Ironically, the particular history of the field itself was seen as getting in the way of its universal possibilities. The field was seen as being too particular because it confined analysis to race, class, and gender. Some users erroneously assumed that these particular concepts, when taken literally, must be present in every analysis, and that the absence of any one category compromised the integrity of race/class/gender studies. Because it was deemed to be too closely associated with the particular, subordinated social groups that were central to its creation and growth, the field of race/class/gender was also seen as having another kind of particularity problem. “Race” meant Black people, “gender” meant women, and “class” meant poor people. Yet race/class/gender never argued that its concepts were confined to subordinated people – it was perfectly capable of studying privilege within the categories of race, class, and gender. Similarly, race, class, and gender were never meant to be used as a fixed list of entities that applied in all times in all places. Rather, race/class/gender was a heuristic that pointed toward other combinations that not only were possible but were better suited for a range of particular issues and contexts.

The heuristic use of intersectionality provides different strengths and limitations. Because intersectionality does not specify the configuration of categories, or even the number of relevant categories for a particular analysis, it seemingly offers more flexibility than race/class/gender studies. By providing a new term that was elastic enough to incorporate the particularities of race/class/gender studies yet expand them to include additional particular concepts, intersectionality ostensibly solved the particularity problem of race/class/gender. Yet intersectionality’s quest for universality – and this is important for its status as a social theory in the making‐meant that it need not attend to its own particular history. Using intersectionality as a heuristic by referring to a generic intersectionality without attending to particulars of the categories themselves, or to the social issues that catalyzed both race/class/gender studies and intersectionality, created new problems. The rapid uptake of intersectionality by adding even more categories suggests a parallelism among these categories, one that implies that each system of power is fundamentally the same. If the categories of race, class, and gender, among others, are equivalent and potential substitutes for one another, then the systems of power that underlie intersectionality are similarly equivalent. Understanding one means understanding the others.

This assumption of equivalence and interchangeability may facilitate intersectionality’s ease of heuristic use, but it simultaneously limits intersectionality’s theoretical potential. For example, the category of class has been often mentioned within intersectionality yet less often treated as an analytical category that is equivalent to race and gender. The categories of nation, sexuality, ethnicity, age, religion, and ability resemble one another but cannot be collapsed into one another under the heading of a generic intersectionality. Each is an analytical category that cannot be simply added together and combined with the others. The relationships among these categories lie in their particulars  –  they must be empirically studied and theorized, not simply assumed for heuristic convenience. This brief comparison of race/class/gender and intersectionality suggests that if a heuristic device is applied uncritically, more as a formula than as a tool of invention for critically engaged social problem solving, it may no longer be able to spark innovation.4 \*\*\*FOOTNOTE BEGINS\*\*\* In Chapter 3 of Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory (2019), I develop this theme of the relationship between particularity and universality by examining intersectionality’s ties to resistant knowledge traditions with social action components. Critical race studies aims to resist racism, feminist studies resists heteropatriarchy, and decolonial studies resists neocolonialism. In this sense, each project reflects the particular social problems confronting Black people, women, and colonized people. Yet each project also sees beyond the particulars of any one group. \*\*\*FOOTNOTE ENDS\*\*\*

Intersectionality as a heuristic offers provisional rules of thumb for rethinking a range of social problems as well as strategies for criticizing how scholarship studies them. In this sense, intersectionality’s metaphoric and heuristic thinking provides important conceptual tools for problem‐solving. These strategies remain important, yet their use should not be conflated with theorizing.

The effects of intersectionality are far‐reaching  –  it has catalyzed significant changes within academic disciplines concerning some of their cherished frameworks, such as the aforementioned case of sociology and work. Intersectionality has also influenced the contours of women’s, gender, and sexuality studies; media studies; and similar interdisciplinary fields of inquiry. Intersectionality’s knowledge and practices stemming from how its practitioners use it might have catalyzed a wealth of new knowledge across many fields of study. To me, intersectionality has reached an important milestone in its own journey, a place where it has catalyzed paradigm shifts across many fields of study, but one where it also must spend time examining its own paradigmatic thought.

Intersectionality and Paradigm Shifts

Paradigms provide frameworks that describe, interpret, analyze, and in some cases, explain both the knowledge that is being produced as well as the processes that are used to produce it. Paradigmatic thinking involves having a model or provisional explanation in mind, a typical pattern of something, a distinct set of concepts or thought patterns. Such thinking is often difficult to recognize as such, because paradigms are often implicit, assumed, and taken for granted. For example, for some time, assumptions about biology and the natural world exerted enormous influence on research on gender and sexual identities, on public policies that understood citizenship through binaries of fit and unfit bodies, as well as on broader evolutionary explanations of the natural and social worlds. The reliance on biological explanations seemed more like the truth itself, rather than just one paradigm among many.

When the paradigmatic thinking in a field changes, the ideas and social relations within that field can also change quite dramatically. Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) description of how paradigm shifts occur in the natural sciences provides a useful rubric for understanding intersectionality’s effects on existing fields of study. Ironically, Kuhn analyzed the way that paradigms changed within the natural sciences as an implicit critique of the social sciences; he wanted to demonstrate how paradigms in the natural sciences provided certainties for scientific disciplines – certainties that the social sciences seemingly lacked. Yet this dimension of his work has been overshadowed by how rapidly the concept of a paradigm shift traveled into the social sciences, as well as into everyday language.5

A paradigm shift is a change not just in ideas, but also in how a field of study reorganizes its practices to facilitate its problem‐solving objectives. When fields encounter anomalies, or puzzles that can no longer be solved within the conventions of their dominant paradigm, they shift, often rather dramatically. The old paradigm can disappear rapidly, with a new one emerging to take its place. A paradigm shift occurs along three dimensions: the new paradigm (i) convincingly resolves previously recognized problems; (ii) has enough unresolved problems to provide puzzles for further inquiry; and (iii) attracts enough specialists to form the core of new, agreed‐upon provisional explanations for the topic at hand. When applied to intersectionality, the concept of a paradigm shift suggests that intersectionality convincingly grapples with recognized social problems concerning social inequality and the social problems it engenders; that its heuristics provide new avenues of investigation for studying social inequality; and that it has attracted a vibrant constellation of scholars and practitioners who recognize intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry and praxis. This newly formulated, heterogeneous community of inquiry both resonates with the metaphor of intersectionality as a collective identity and relies on heuristic thinking for social problem solving.

This concept of a paradigm shift is especially useful for thinking through the changes that intersectionality has engendered within disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields. Kuhn’s argument is targeted toward the changes within the natural sciences, where paradigms consist of shared assumptions within an existing field of study, subfields within a particular discipline, or both. Yet when uncoupled from the assumption that paradigm shifts occur primarily within existing fields of inquiry, Kuhn’s basic argument concerning paradigm shifts also applies to broader interpretive frameworks. Paradigm shifts are significant because they describe what happens when traditional frameworks no longer sufficiently explain social realities and thus become ineffective. In this sense, the concept of a paradigm shift is especially important for intersectionality as a critical social theory in the making, because a paradigm shift identifies a significant turning point when established social theories lose their critical edge and when other social theories displace them.

Across academic disciplines, traditional paradigms approached racial inequality and gender inequality, for example, as distinct, separate, and disconnected phenomena. Because race, class, gender, sexuality, age, ethnicity, nation, and, ability were conceptualized as separate phenomena, their interactions remained invisible because no one thought to look for them. Using intersectionality as a metaphor fundamentally challenged this takenfor‐granted assumption, and using intersectionality as a heuristic developed new knowledge as evidence for intersectional claims. In this [Table Omitted] sense, intersectionality was not just an adjustment to business as usual. It pointed toward a fundamental paradigm shift in thinking about intersecting systems of power and their connections to intersecting social inequalities.

In the following section, I sketch out selected core constructs and guiding premises of intersectionality that are drawn from my readings of intersectional inquiry as well as my understandings of intersectional practice. When combined, these core constructs and guiding premises provide a provisional template for analyzing intersectionality’s ideas and practices. My goal is to address some ideas of intersectionality’s paradigmatic use  –  namely, the core constructs and guiding premises within intersectionality’s critical inquiry.

Table 7.1 provides a provisional schema of the paradigmatic ideas that form the content of intersectionality’s critical inquiry. These ideas come from its metaphoric, heuristic, and paradigmatic uses. This schema distinguishes between the core constructs that reappear across intersectionality and guiding premises that inform intersectional analysis.

Intersectionality’s core constructs routinely appear within intersectional inquiry, either as topics of investigation or as methodological premises that guide research itself. They are (i) relationality; (ii) power; (iii) social inequality; (iv) social context; (v) complexity; and (vi) social justice (Collins and Bilge 2016, pp. 25–30, 194–204). For example, when it comes to social science research, intersectionality requires attending to complexity, whether in the questions asked, the methods used in a study, or the interpretation of findings.

Core Constructs and Guiding Premises

Intersectionality’s core constructs constitute one important dimension of intersectionality’s paradigmatic thinking. The themes of relationality, power, social inequality, social context, complexity, and social justice reappear across intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry and practice (Collins and Bilge 2016, pp. 25–30, 194–204). When it comes to scholarship, these themes are not all present in a given work, the treatment of them varies considerably across research traditions, and the relationship among them is far from coherent. My goal here is to identify intersectionality’s core constructs that, either singularly or in combination, reappear within intersectional scholarship. Significantly, none of these themes is unique to intersectionality in the academy. They also appear across diverse projects with little apparent connection to intersectionality. Intersectionality often shares terminology and sensibility with similar projects but is not derivative of them. Identifying these core constructs constitutes a promising first step in sketching out intersectionality’s paradigmatic use in scholarship. Significantly, how these constructs are used within intersectionality offers a window into intersectionality’s critical inquiry.

Relationality constitutes the first core theme that shapes heterogeneous intersectional projects (Phoenix and Pattynama 2006, p. 187). This emphasis on relationality shifts focus away from the essential qualities that seemingly lie in the center of categories and toward the relational processes that connect them. The idea of relationality is essential to intersectionality itself. The very term intersectionality invokes the idea of interconnections, mutual engagement, and relationships. Race, gender, class, and other systems of power are constituted and maintained through relational processes, gaining meaning through the nature of these relationships. The analytic importance of relationality in intersectional scholarship demonstrates how various social positions (occupied by actors, systems, and political/economic structural arrangements) necessarily acquire meaning and power (or a lack thereof) in relation to other social positions.

The significance of power constitutes a second core theme of intersectionality’s critical inquiry. Intersecting power relations produce social divisions of race, gender, class, sexuality, ability, age, country of origin, and citizenship status that are unlikely to be adequately understood in isolation from one another. Non‐intersectional scholarship assumes that race, class, and gender are unconnected variables or features of social organization that can be studied as singular phenomena – for example, gender or race as discreet aspects of individual identity, or patriarchy or racism as monocategorical systems of power. Intersectionality posits that systems of power co‐produce one another in ways that reproduce both unequal material outcomes and the distinctive social experiences that characterize people’s experiences within social hierarchies. Racism, sexism, class exploitation, and similar oppressions may mutually construct one another by drawing upon similar and distinctive practices and forms of organization that collectively shape social reality.

Third, intersectionality has catalyzed a rethinking of social inequality. Within the academy, prevailing frameworks explained social inequalities as separate entities, for example, class inequality, racial inequality, gender inequality, and social inequalities of sexuality, nation, ability, and ethnicity. The causes of social inequality often lay in fundamental forces that lay outside the particulars of race, class, gender. Yet treating social inequality as a result of other, seemingly more fundamental social processes suggested that social inequality was inevitable because it was hardwired into the social world, into individual nature, or into both. Intersectionality rejects these notions that normalize inequality by depicting it as natural and inevitable.

A fourth core theme within intersectionality’s critical inquiry stresses the significance of social context. This theme is especially important for understanding how interpretive communities, both academic and activist, organize knowledge production. This premise applies to the internal dynamics of a given interpretive community, for example, how sociologists or women’s studies scholars go about their work; to the relationships among interpretive communities, such as how sociology and Africana Studies within academia develop different interpretations of race and racism; as well as to how communities of inquiry are hierarchically arranged and valued, for example, how Western colleges and universities rank the sciences over the humanities. Social context also matters in understanding how the distinctive social locations of individuals and groups within intersecting power relations shape intellectual production.

Managing complexity constitutes a fifth core theme of intersectionality’s critical inquiry. Intersectional knowledge projects achieve greater levels of complexity because they are iterative and interactional, always examining the connections among seemingly distinctive categories of analysis. Complexity is dynamic  – intersectionality’s categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality, among others, are a useful starting point for inquiry. Bringing multiple lenses to intersectional inquiry facilitates complex, comprehensive analyses. Managing complexity also speaks to intersectionality’s methodological contours. Complex questions may require equally complex strategies for investigation.

Social justice constitutes another core construct that underlies intersectionality’s critical inquiry. The construct of social justice raises questions about the ethics of intersectional scholarship and practice. Within contemporary academic venues, the significance of social justice as a core theme within intersectionality is increasingly challenged by norms that place social justice, freedom, equality, and similar ethical issues as secondary concerns within acceptable scholarship. Viewing theory and practice in binary terms not only fosters a division between truth and power within intersectionality; it also challenges intersectionality’s long‐standing commitment to social justice. Historically, social justice was so central to intersectionality that there was little need to examine it or invoke it. Currently, many intersectional projects do not deal with social justice in a substantive fashion, yet the arguments that each discourse makes and praxis that it pursues have important ethical implications for equity and fairness.

How might these core constructs within intersectionality’s critical inquiry shape it? Some concepts are so fundamental to intersectionality itself that removing them would compromise the very meaning of intersectionality. Relationality constitutes one core construct. It is reflected in the name of the field itself, shapes the methodological premises of intersectional projects, and describes the content of intersectional knowledge. The very question of the connections among intersectionality’s core constructs is fundamentally one of relationality. In contrast, other core themes are more contingent. For example, intersecting systems of power as well as social inequalities of race, class, gender, and similar categories of analysis occupy prominent positions within intersectionality. Yet, does the absence of a particular category of analysis within intersectional inquiry somehow lessen its value? Similarly, some intersectional scholarship is inattentive to power relations or ethical standards of social justice. Does this absence make these projects less authentically intersectional? Some core constructs are differentially contingent. They can be used to structure a study itself, the case of attending to social context, or they can be used to evaluate outcomes; for example, is a particular study stronger because intersectionality has fostered greater complexity?

This brings me to another important dimension of intersectionality’s critical inquiry – namely, my provisional list of guiding premises that distinguish intersectional scholarship (see Table 7.1). Such premises should be recognizable to intersectionality’s practitioners in the ways that those of any field of inquiry are to its researchers, teachers, and students. These guiding premises synthesize the assumptions that intersectionality’s practitioners take into their projects in order to guide their work: (i) Race, class, gender, and similar systems of power are interdependent and mutually construct one another; (ii) Intersecting power relations produce complex, interdependent social inequalities of race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, ethnicity, ability, and age; (iii) The social location of individuals and groups within intersecting power relations shapes their experiences within and perspectives on the social world; (iv) Solving social problems within a given local, regional, national, or global context requires intersectional analyses (see also Collins 2015; Collins and Bilge 2016). These core constructs and guiding principles provide a vocabulary for describing intersectionality’s paradigm shift. This shift raises important questions about how intersectionality’s cognitive architecture might inform intersectional theorizing. This framework also offers a way of seeing the limits of paradigmatic thinking and the possibilities of the beginnings of theorizing. How might intersectionality’s core constructs inform the guiding premises within the field of intersectionality itself? Conversely, how might these guiding premises shed light on the meaning of intersectionality’s core constructs?